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ABSTRACT
Intrusion Detection in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. (May 2004)
Bo Sun, B.S., Nanjing University of Posts & Telecommunications;
M.S., Beijing University of Posts & Telecommunications
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Udo W. Pooch
Most existent protocols, applications and services for Mobile Ad Hoc NET-
works (MANETs) assume a cooperative and friendly network environment and do
not accommodate security. Therefore, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), serving
as the second line of defense for information systems, are indispensable for MANETs
with high security requirements.
Central to the research described in this dissertation is the proposed two-level
nonoverlapping Zone-Based Intrusion Detection System (ZBIDS) which fit the unique
requirement of MANETs. First, in the low-level of ZBIDS, I propose an intrusion de-
tection agent model and present a Markov Chain based anomaly detection algorithm.
Local and trusted communication activities such as routing table related features are
periodically selected and formatted with minimum errors from raw data. A Markov
Chain based normal profile is then constructed to capture the temporal dependency
among network activities and accommodate the dynamic nature of raw data. A lo-
cal detection model aggregating abnormal behaviors is constructed to reflect recent
subject activities in order to achieve low false positive ratio and high detection ratio.
A set of criteria to tune parameters is developed and the performance trade-off is
discussed.
Second, I present a nonoverlapping Zone-based framework to manage locally
generated alerts from a wider area. An alert data model conformed to the Intru-
iv
sion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is presented to suit the needs of
MANETs. Furthermore, an aggregation algorithm utilizing attribute similarity from
alert messages is proposed to integrate security related information from a wider area.
In this way, the gateway nodes of ZBIDS can reduce false positive ratio, improve de-
tection ratio, and present more diagnostic information about the attack.
Third, MANET IDSs need to consider mobility impact and adjust their behav-
ior dynamically. I first demonstrate that nodes’ moving speed, a commonly used
parameter in tuning IDS performance, is not an effective metric for the performance
measurement of MANET IDSs. A new feature - link change rate - is then proposed as
a unified metric for local MANET IDSs to adaptively select normal profiles . Different
mobility models are utilized to evaluate the performance of the adaptive mechanisms.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we first illustrate why Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are nec-
essary when we deploy Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) in reality. We then
discuss why traditional wired IDSs are not applicable to MANETs and the research
challenges when we design MANET IDSs. Finally, an overview of the dissertation
will conclude this chapter.
A. Introduction and Motivation
Unlike conventional cellular wireless mobile networks that rely on extensive infras-
tructure to support mobility, MANETs do not need expensive base stations or wired
infrastructure. The absence of a fixed infrastructure requires mobile hosts in MANETs
to cooperate with each other for message transmissions. To form such a cooperative
self-configurable environment, every mobile host is supposed to be a friendly node
and is willing to relay messages for others to their ultimate destinations. Global
trustworthiness in all network nodes is the main fundamental security assumption in
MANETs.
However, this assumption is not always true in reality. The nature of MANETs
makes them very vulnerable to malicious attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping
to active interfering. Most routing protocols only focus on providing efficient route
discovery and maintenance functionality and pay little attention to routing security.
Very few of them specify security measures from the very beginning. The nature of
MANETs makes them very vulnerable to malicious attacks compared to traditional
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Computers.
2wired networks, because of the use of wireless links, the low degree of physical security
of the mobile nodes, the dynamic topology, the limited power supply and the absence
of central management point [1]. Some environments (such as the military tactical
operations) have very stringent requirements on security, which make the deployment
of security-related technologies necessary.
Intrusion prevention measures, such as encryption and authentication, can be
used in MANETs to reduce intrusions, but cannot eliminate them. For example,
a physically captured node that carries the private keys may allow the defeat of
the authentication safeguards. The history of security research has demonstrated
that no matter how many intrusion prevention measures are used, there are always
some weak points in the system. In a network with high security requirements, it
is necessary to deploy intrusion detection techniques. MANET IDSs, serving as the
second wall of defense to protect MANETs, should operate together with prevention
mechanisms (authentication, encryption etc.) to guarantee an environment with high-
secure requirements. They should complement and integrate with other MANET
security measures to provide a high-survivability network.
However, most of today’s Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) focus on wired
networks. The dramatic differences between MANETs and wired networks make it
inapplicable to apply traditional wired ID technologies directly to MANETs. MANET
does not have a fixed infrastructure. While most of today’s wired IDSs, which rely
on real-time traffic parse, filter, format and analysis, usually monitor the traffic at
switches, routers, and gateways. The lack of such traffic concentration point makes
traditional wired IDSs inapplicable on MANET platforms. Each node can only use
the partial and localized communication activities as the available audit traces. There
are also some characteristics in MANET such as disconnected operations [2], which
seldom exist in wired networks. What’s more, each mobile node has limited resources
3(such as limited wireless bandwidth, computation ability and energy supply, etc.),
which means MANET IDSs should have the property to be lightweight. All of these
imply the inapplicability of wired IDSs on the MANET platform. Furthermore, in
MANETs, it is very difficult for IDSs to tell the validity of some operations. For
example, the reason that one node sends out falsified routing information could be
because this node is compromised, or because the link is broken due to the physical
movement of the node. All these suggest that an IDS of a different architecture needs
to be developed to be applicable on the MANET platform [1].
B. Research Challenges
It is very challenging to design an intrusion detection system for mobile ad-hoc net-
works. The lack of fixed infrastructures and concentration points make it difficult to
collect audit data for the entire network. However, detection models only relying on
partial and localized information are difficult to achieve desirable performance. We also
need to consider the scarce MANET resources (such as limited wireless bandwidth,
computation ability and energy supply, etc.) when we design the IDS framework
for MANETs. What’s more, mobility makes the distinction between normalcy and
anomalcy obscure. It is more difficult to distinguish false alarms and real intrusions.
For example, a node that sends out falsified routing information could be because it
has been compromised, or because of its arbitrary movement [1].
In summary, the following lists the research challenges in designing a viable
intrusion detection system for mobile ad-hoc networks:
• What is the good intrusion detection framework for mobile ad-hoc networks?
• What are the statistical security features that could be used to construct de-
tection models?
4• What are the appropriate approach to construct detection models?
C. Overview of the Dissertation
It is very difficult to design a once-for-all intrusion detection system. Instead, an
incremental enhancement strategy may be more feasible. A secure protocol should at
least include mechanisms against known attack types. In addition, it should provide
a scheme to easily add new security features in the future. Due to the importance of
MANET routing protocols, we focus on the detection of attacks targeted at MANET
routing protocols. Specifically, we use the routing disruption attack as the threat
model throughout this dissertation. The general methodology is: we first establish
the local detection model for MANET routing activities, then develop framework
to facilitate the cooperation of IDS agents. The whole dissertation is organized as
follows.
In Chapter II, we summarize the related work which has been done in wired and
wireless intrusion detection systems. This includes alert aggregation and correlation
systems which build on existing IDS prototypes in order to improve detection per-
formance. We further introduce a few important existing prototypes and detection
algorithms for wired networks, and demonstrate that very few research efforts have
been devoted to MANET IDSs. We detail the characteristics of MANETs, especially
their routing protocols, and describe why they are particularly vulnerable to attacks.
The understanding of MANET characteristics is necessary for us to develop a proper
MANET IDS system. We also summarize the existing prevention mechanisms for
MANETs because they need to integrate with MANET IDSs to provide a highly sur-
vivable network. Note that the research described in this dissertation only focuses on
the detection part, although intrusion response component is necessary in the system.
5In Chapter III, we propose a nonoverlapping Zone-Based Intrusion Detection
System (ZBIDS) that fits the requirements of mobile ad-hoc networks. In the system
aspect of ZBIDS, an IDS agent is attached to each node. The network is logically
divided into nonoverlapping zones which enable these agents to cooperate with each
other to perform the intrusion detection task. Each IDS agent performs the function-
alities of low level ZBIDS. It utilizes the local and trusted information and runs inde-
pendently to monitor the node’s local activities for abnormal behaviors and broadcast
the locally generated alerts inside the zone. We present an internal model of the IDS
agent and describe a Markov Chain based anomaly detection algorithm to construct
its local detection engine. The details of feature selection, data collection, data pre-
process, Markov Chain construction, classifier construction and parameter tuning are
described. A simple approach utilizing relative entropy is adopted to demonstrate
the effectiveness of selected features. In the high level of ZBIDS, the gateway nodes
(also called interzone nodes, those nodes which have physical connections to different
zones) of each zone are responsible for aggregating and correlating the locally gen-
erated alerts inside the zone in order to make the final decisions. An algorithm is
presented to aggregate the locally generated alerts and to further improve the per-
formance of ZBIDS. In ZBIDS, only gateway nodes can utilize alerts to generate the
alarms. In this dissertation, we use alerts to denote the potential security breaches
identified by local IDS agents, while alarms are finalized decisions made by ZBIDS
to indicate an intrusion. An alert format compatible with the Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [3] is presented to facilitate the interoperability
of IDS agents.
In Chapter IV, based on Parsec [4] and GloMosim [5], extensive simulation
is carried out in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of ZBIDS. Under Random
Waypoint model and use the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [6] as the
6exemplary routing protocol, different sets of data, i.e., training data, test data, and
attack data, are collected at different mobility levels. False positive ratio, detection
ratio, and Mean Time to First Alarm (MTFA) are computed to measure the per-
formance of ZBIDS. Detailed analysis of simulation results is provided. Proposed
aggregation algorithm is also simulated to illustrate its better performance compared
to local IDS.
In Chapter V, we describe our initial efforts in constructing an adaptive local
MANET IDSs. How to effectively integrate mobility impact into MANET IDSs and
take adaptiveness into consideration is very important. In Chapter V, focusing on
the protection of MANET routing protocols, we first demonstrate that node moving
speed, a most commonly used parameter in measuring MANET performance, is not
desirable with respect to the performance measurement of local MANET IDSs. Then
we propose the usage of a new feature - the link change rate, which could not only
act as a unified metric in measuring MANET IDS performance, but also be used to
facilitate local MANET IDSs to select normal profiles adaptively. We utilize different
mobility models, Random Waypoint Model and Random Drunken Model, to study
the performance of our proposed adaptive mechanism at different mobility levels.
Simulation results show that our proposed adaptive mechanisms could provide IDSs
which are less dependent on mobility models and keep roughly the same performance
compared to non-adaptive mechanisms in terms of false positive ratio, detection ratio
and MTFA. Detailed analysis of simulation results is also provided.
Chapter VI concludes this dissertation and lists important future work. Because
not many research efforts have been devoted to MANET IDSs, this research only
provides the initial effort in constructing a viable MANET IDS. Based on the detailed
methodology of building ZBIDS described in this dissertation, Chapter VI summarizes
important future directions in this respect.
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RELATED WORK
Intrusion detection research on MANETs requires the discussion of intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDSs), alert aggregation and correlation systems and mobile ad-hoc
networks. As we have mentioned, extensive research efforts have been devoted to
wired IDSs, however, there are few work devoted to wireless IDSs. In recent years,
several wired aggregation and correlation systems have emerged in order to improve
the performance of wired IDSs. To the best of my knowledge, there are no work
devoted to alert aggregation on MANET platform prior to the work described in this
dissertation.
In this chapter, we first introduce the background knowledge of intrusion detec-
tion systems. This will cover wired IDSs, wired aggregation and correlation tech-
niques, and wireless IDSs. We then introduce mobile ad hoc networks and their
routing protocols. The understandings of these are necessary for us to construct a
suitable MANET IDSs.
A. Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is a security technology that attempts to identify individuals who
are trying to break into and misuse a system without authorization and those who
have legitimate access to the system but are abusing their privileges [7]. The system
protected is used to denote an information system being monitored by an intrusion
detection system. It can be a host or a network equipment, such as a server, a firewall,
a router, or a corporate network, etc [8].
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a computer system that dynamically
monitors the system and user actions in the network and computer systems in order
8to detect intrusions. Because an information system can suffer from various kinds
of security vulnerabilities, it is both technically difficult and economically costly to
build and maintain a system which is not susceptible to attacks. Experience teaches
us never to rely on a single defensive line or technique. IDSs, by analyzing the system
and user operations in search of activity undesirable and suspicious, can effectively
monitor and protect against threats. IDSs have been widely regarded as being part
of the solution to protect today’s computer systems.
Research on IDSs began with a report by Anderson [9] followed by Denning’s
seminal paper [10], which lays the foundation for most of the current intrusion
detection prototypes. Since then, many research efforts have been devoted to wired
IDSs. Numerous detection techniques and architecture for host machines and wired
networks have been proposed. A good taxonomy of wired IDSs is presented in [8].
With the rapid proliferation of wireless networks and mobile computing applica-
tions, new vulnerabilities that do not exist in wired networks have appeared. Security
poses a serious challenge in deploying wireless networks in reality. However, the vast
difference between wired and wireless networks make traditional intrusion detection
techniques inapplicable. Wireless IDSs, emerging as a new research topic, aim at
developing new architecture and mechanisms to protect the wireless networks.
1. Wired Intrusion Detection Systems
Focusing mainly on network traffic data and computer audit data, there are two
general approaches to detecting intrusions: misuse based intrusion detection (also
referred to as knowledge-based detection, or detection by appearance) and anomaly
based intrusion detection (also referred to as behavior-based detection or detection
by behavior). They are complementary to each other for intrusion detection.
9a. Misuse Based Intrusion Detection Systems
Misuse based IDSs operate based on a database of known attack signatures and system
vulnerabilities. When IDS analyzer identifies an activity matching a signature that
is stored in the database, an alarm is triggered. The advantages of misuse based
IDSs include that they may have very low false alarm ratio. The triggered alarms are
meaningful because the attack signatures contain the diagnostic information about
the cause of the alarm. Disadvantages include that its completeness is not good
because the attack signature databases and system vulnerabilities need to be kept
up-to-date. This is a tedious task because new attacks and system vulnerabilities
are detected on a daily basis. Careful analysis of the vulnerabilities is also time-
consuming. Misuse detection based IDSs also face the generalization issues because
most of the knowledge of the attacks is focused on the different versions of operating
systems and applications.
There are several approaches in misuse detection. They differ in the representa-
tion as well as the matching algorithm employed to detect intrusion patterns. Here
we simply list the main approaches:
• Expert system: Expert systems provide strategies and mechanisms for process-
ing facts regarding the state of a given environment, and derive logical inferences
from these facts. Audit events and the security policy are mapped to the facts
that are recorded and evaluated by the system. During the process of mapping,
a semantic meaning is attached to increase the abstraction level of the audit
data. The expert system contains a set of rules that describe the attacks. These
rules are triggered when certain activities that can satisfy their conditions hap-
pen. The execution speed of the expert system shell is usually poor because
all of the audit data need to import into the shell as facts. Therefore, expert
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system based IDSs only exist in research prototypes, as performance is more
important in commercial products.
Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMER-
ALD) [11] is an extension of the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES)
[12] [13] and Next Generation Intrusion Detection System (NIDES) [14] by
SRI International. EMERALD uses a rule-based expert system component for
misuse detection. A forward-chaining rule-based expert system development
toolset called the Production-Based Expert System Toolset (P-BEST) [15] is
utilized to develop a modern generic signature-analysis engine. A chain of rules
is established utilizing P-BEST to form the signature database.
• Pattern Recognition: In this approach, the encoding of known intrusion signa-
tures as patterns (e.g., strings, a sequence of events, etc.) are matched against
the audit data. The incoming events are searched to match the patterns repre-
senting intrusion scenarios. This method allows a very efficient implementation.
Therefore, they are commonly used in commercial tools, such as RealSecure of
Internet Security Systems [16].
• Colored Petri Nets: In this method, the signatures of the intrusions are modeled
as a number of different states, which form Colored Petri Nets (CPNs). It has
more generalities to represent the signatures and make it easy to write complex
intrusion scenarios. However, it is very computationally expensive to try to
manifest the misbehavior in the audit trail. Intrusion Detection In Our Time
(IDIOT) is the one example that uses CPNs [17].
• State transition analysis: In this approach, an intrusion is represented as a
sequence of actions performed by an intruder that leads from the initial state
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to the target compromised state. State transition diagrams identify the steps
and the requirements of the penetration. The states that make up the intrusion
form a simple chain that has to be traversed from the beginning to the end. It
is a technique proposed by Porras and Kemmerer [18], which is implemented
in Ustat - a real-time intrusion detection system for UNIX [19].
b. Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection Systems
Anomaly based IDSs assume that an intrusion can be detected by observing a devia-
tion from normal or expected behavior of the systems or users. Normalcy is defined by
the previously observed subject behavior, which is usually created during a training
phase. The normal profile is later compared with the current activity. If a deviation
is observed, IDS flag the unusual activity and generate an alarm. The advantages of
anomaly detection based IDSs include that they might be complete to detect attacks,
i.e., they can detect attempts that try to exploit new and unforeseen vulnerabilities.
They are also less system-dependent. Disadvantages include that they may have very
high false alarm ratio and are more difficult to configure because the comprehensive
knowledge of the expected behavior of the system is required. They usually require
a periodic online learning process in order to build the up-to-date normal behav-
ior profile. Anomaly detection approach is harder to implement, which make them
inappropriate for commercial use.
Several anomaly detection techniques exist and differ in the representation of a
normal profile and the inference of a deviation from the normal profile. The main
approaches used in anomaly detection are:
• Statistics: Statistical-based anomaly detection techniques build a statistical
profile (e.g., statistical distribution) of subject normal activities from historic
12
data by measuring a number of variables over time. Examples of the variables
are the login/logoff times, the time duration of one session, the number of
packets transmitted in this session, etc.
In EMERALD [11], the statistical algorithms employ four classes of measures
to track subject activities: categorical, continuous, intensity, and event distribu-
tion. The profile is subdivided into short and long-term elements. A short-term
profile may characterize the recent activity of the system, while a long-term
profile is slowly adapted to the changes of the system activity. Many traffic
perspectives are used to profile TCP/IP streams [11]. For example, all ICMP
exchanges are parsed to analyze ICMP-specific transactions. The application-
layer sessions from specific internal hosts to specific external hosts are analyzed
for specific applications.
• Neural networks: The use of neural networks in IDS consists of three steps:
learning the normal pattern of the system by collecting the training data; train-
ing the neural networks to identify the subject; applying the output of the
neural networks to the observed activity to identify intrusions. Neural networks
are computationally intensive, so they are not widely used in IDSs. Hyperview
[20] is an example IDS that uses neural networks.
There are other anomaly detection techniques: anomaly detection techniques
based on immunology [21] capture a large set of event sequences as the normal profile
from historic data of subject normal activities, and use either negative selection or
positive selection algorithms to detect the difference of incoming event sequences
from event sequences in the normal profile [22]. Expert systems can also be used to
implement anomaly detection techniques [13]. The IDSs can study the activities of
the target system to form a set of rules to describe its normal behavior. Lee et al.
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proposed to use datamining approach to construct intrusion detection models [23].
Anomaly detection techniques utilizing Chi-square test are also introduced in [24]
and [25].
There are also anomaly detection techniques that use a first-order or high-order
Markov model of event transitions to represent a normal profile [26] [27] [28] [29].
In [26], utilizing a Markov Chain model, Jha et al. proposed a general framework
for constructing anomaly detectors. We modify it to fit MANET requirements. We
define the from state as the previous w ordered values of the categorized statistical
measure and the to state as the current statistical feature value. That is, we define the
from state as {Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xi+w−1}, and to state as {Xi+w} (w is a parameter that
characterizes the Markov Chain). Therefore, we can consider the routing changes as
a random process with stationary transition probabilities. We use the VQ algorithm
[30] to preprocess the data and introduce “rare symbol” to construct a Markov Chain
which would lead to better results in our environment. Locality frame is also used in
the classifier construction. We also adopt a different approach to tune the parameters.
Details of our methodology are described in Chapter III.
Besides misuse detection and anomaly detection, there is a new class of detection
algorithm: specification-based techniques [31]. It combines the advantages of misuse
detection and anomaly detection techniques. They detect attacks as deviations from
a normal profile. Their approaches are based on manually developed specifications,
thus avoiding the high rate of false alarms. However, the development of detailed
specifications can be time-consuming.
2. Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems
Relatively few research efforts have been devoted to wireless IDSs. In [32], Kachirski
at al. proposed a distributed intrusion detection system for ad hoc wireless networks
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based on mobile agent technology. In [33], Samfat et al. proposed an Intrusion
Detection Architecture for Mobile Networks (IDAMN). Its main functionality is to
track and detect mobile intruders in real time. IDAMN includes two algorithms
which model the behavior of users in terms of both telephony activities and migration
patterns. In [34], a routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks is identified: a
node may misbehave by agreeing to forward packets and then failing to do so, because
it is overloaded, selfish, malicious, or broken. The authors proposed to install extra
facilities, watchdog and pathrater, to identify routing misbehavior in MANETs.
In the pioneer work of wireless intrusion detection research, Yongguang et al.
[1] proposed a general intrusion detection and intrusion response architecture for
MANETs. An agent is attached to each mobile node, and each node in the network
participates in the intrusion detection and response. A majority-based distributed
intrusion detection approach is proposed to facilitate the cooperation of neighboring
nodes. Many of our ideas benefit from the research described in [1] [35]. In [36], a new
data mining method that performs the “cross-feature” analysis to capture the inter-
feature correlation patterns of MANET normal traffic is introduced to construct the
normal profile. They focused on techniques for automatically constructing anomaly
detection methods that are capable of detecting new attacks.
B. Wired Aggregation and Correlation Systems
Alert aggregation and correlation techniques are important to overcome the short-
comings manifested by IDSs. These shortcomings include the overwhelming alerts
(alert flooding) generated by IDSs, high false positive ratio of the generated alerts,
and the poor diagnosis information provided by the alerts. Existing alert aggregation
and correlation systems have demonstrated promising approaches to analyze alerts
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and generate more global and synthetic alerts.
Several alert aggregation and correlation techniques [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42]
have been proposed to facilitate the analysis of intrusions. Based on the abundant
attack scenarios, these approaches try to find the causal relationships between alerts
and reveal the attack strategies. In [37], an aggregation and correlation component
is built in Tivoli Enterprise Console. Cuppens et al. [38] [39] use Lambda language
to specify attack scenarios and use Prolog predicates to correlate alerts based on
IDMEF data model. In [40], a probabilistic method is used to correlate alerts using
the attribute similarity among their features. Ning et al. [41] develop three utilities
to facilitate the analysis of large sets of correlated alerts. In [42], a formal data model
called M2D2 is proposed in order to make full use of the available information. The
effectiveness of the proposed aggregation and correlation algorithms depends heavily
on the information provided by the individual IDS.
C. Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
Unlike conventional cellular wireless mobile networks that rely on extensive infras-
tructure to support mobility, a wireless Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) does not
need expensive base stations or wired infrastructure. Nodes within the radio range of
each other can communicate directly over the wireless links, while those that are far
apart use other nodes as relays. In MANETs, each host must act as a router since
routes are mostly multihop. Nodes in such a network move arbitrarily, thus the net-
work topology changes frequently and unpredictably. Moreover, the wireless channel
bandwidth is limited, and the mobile nodes operate on the constrained battery power
which will eventually be exhausted.
Extensive research efforts have been devoted to various issues related to MANETS.
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Because this research focuses on the protection of MANET routing protocols, here
we briefly describe existing MANET routing protocols.
1. Routing Protocols of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
Many routing protocols have been proposed for MANETs. In general, these proto-
cols could be divided into three categories: proactive, reactive, and hybrid. Proactive
routing protocols (such as Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing protocol
(DSDV) [43] and the Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [44]) waste limited band-
width by continuously maintaining the complete routing information about the whole
network. They react to topology changes, even if there is no traffic. They are also
called table-driven methods. The protocols in this area differ in the number of tables
maintained, the information each table contains as well as the details of how they are
updated. Reactive routing protocols (such as Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector
routing protocol (AODV) [45], the Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA)
[46], and the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [6]) are based on demand for
data transmission. They can significantly reduce the routing overhead when the traf-
fic is lightweight and the topology changes less dramatically, since they do not need
to periodically update route information and do not need to find and maintain the
routes when there is no traffic. The differences among reactive routing protocols lie in
the implementation of the path discovery mechanism and optimizations to it. Hybrid
methods combine proactive and reactive methods to find efficient routes. ZHLS [47]
is one example of hybrid routing protocols. In ZHLS, the whole network is divided
into nonoverlapping zones. ZHLS is proactive if the traffic destination is within the
same zone of the source. It is reactive because a location search is needed to find the
zone ID of the destination.
Fig. 1 is a categorization of existing routing protocols in MANETs. In the figure,
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solid lines represent direct descendants while dotted lines depict logical descendants.
Since new routing protocols are always being proposed for MANETs, we do not expect
to include all of them here.
MANET Routing Protocols
Reactive (On-Demand Driven) HybridProactive (Table Driven)
DSDV WRP LANMARGSR OSLR
CGSR Fisheye
Flooding AODV LMR
SSR
ABRDSR
TORA
LAR DREAM CEDAR ZRP ZHLS
 
Fig. 1. A Classification of MANET Routing Protocols.
2. Prevention Mechanisms in MANETs
MANET IDSs can only provide one layer of defense for MANETs. They should
complement existing prevention techniques in order to provide a highly survivable
system. Considerable research [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57]
[58] has been devoted to MANET prevention mechanisms, especially focused on the
routing layer. In order to better understand the role of IDSs in MANETs, we briefly
summarize the prevention mechanisms.
Zhou and Haas [50], Dahill et al. [51] proposed to use asymmetric cryptogra-
phy to secure on demand MANET routing protocols. However, its potential intensive
computation may make the nodes in the network unable to verify the signatures
quickly enough. Hu, Johnson and Perrig [52] proposed to use hash chains to secure
DSDV and the use of Ariadne [58] with TESLA, an efficient broadcast authentica-
tion scheme that requires loose time synchronization. In [48], the authors proposed
18
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) based on the assumption that there exists a security
association and a shared secret key between the source node and the destination node.
In [53], a new routing technique called Security-Aware ad hoc Routing (SAR) was
introduced. It assumes a pre-established trust hierarchy and the network is classified
into different trust and privilege levels. Nodes at each trust levels share symmetric
encryption and decryption keys.
There are also some works devoted to protecting MANETs against specific at-
tacks. In [59], Hu et al. introduced a wormhole attack, in which the attacker records
a packet, or individual bits from a packet, at one location in the network, tunnels the
packet to another location, and replays it there. They also introduced the general
mechanism of packet leashes - geographic leashes and temporal leashes to detect worm-
hole attacks. In [60], rushing attack is introduced, and Rushing Attack Prevention
(RAP) is developed to defend against this new attack.
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CHAPTER III
ZONE-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are necessary in Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs)
with high-survivability requirements. Serving as the second wall of defense to protect
MANETs, they complement intrusion prevention techniques to tackle the exploitable
weaknesses of the system. Our objective is to design a suitable intrusion detection
system which could meet the requirements of MANETs.
In this chapter, we describe a nonoverlapping Zone-Based Intrusion Detection
System (ZBIDS). Section A provides the assumptions and the network model. Section
B briefly introduces the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [6] protocol which is used
as the example routing protocol throughout this research. It then details the threat
model - the routing disruption attack. Section C presents the nonoverlapping Zone-
Based Intrusion Detection System (ZBIDS), which mainly consists of two parts: the
local intrusion detection agent and the nonoverlapping zone based framework. Section
D provides the detailed descriptions of the local IDS agent. The functionality of each
module is specified. Section E illustrates a Markov Chain based anomaly detection
algorithm. Detailed procedures from feature selection, data preprocess, Markov Chain
model construction, and the classifier construction are provided In order to achieve
desirable performances, an approach to tune the parameters of the detection model is
also presented. Section F depicts an aggregation algorithm used in ZBIDS. It works
together with the local detection agent to form a complete intrusion detection system.
An alert class hierarchy used by ZBIDS is also depicted. The proposed alert class
hierarchy conforms to the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)
[3], which could facilitate the interoperability with other IDS systems. Section H
concludes this chapter.
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A. Assumptions and Network Model
1. Assumptions
All security systems must rely on some specific assumptions to guarantee their effec-
tiveness. Our ZBIDS system is valid under the following assumptions.
We assume that the network can be divided into nonoverlapping zones. For
example, each node can utilize a Global Positioning System or other methods [47]
to find its physical location and determine its zone identity by mapping its physical
location to a predefined zone map. The partitioning of the network could be based
on simple geographic partitioning or other clustering algorithms [61]. We also assume
that the zone partitioning mechanism is accurate and safe.
This research focuses on the protection of MANETs. Preventing and detecting
attacks aimed at IDS itself will be another challenging research topic and is beyond the
discussion of this dissertation. We assume the local IDS agent is tamper resistant.
There are many software tamper resistance techniques [62] that are very hard to
crack. Under these techniques, the attacker will not be able to reverse engineer
any secrets from the “good” agents. The secret embedded in the software could be
prevented from being extracted by the attacker. Under this assumption, we do not
need to consider the security issues of the IDS agent itself. In addition, we assume
that information exchange between IDS agents cannot be forged by an attacker.
This excludes the possibility that some compromised node actively generates falsified
alerts to disrupt the correct execution of the aggregation algorithm. When the local
IDS is not tamper resistant, the compromised IDS has no incentive to send reports
because this may result in the detection of attackers. Also, the alerts provided by
noncompromised IDSs could dominate the information that gateway nodes collect.
This could still enable the correct execution of the aggregation algorithm described
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in Section F.
We assume that when initiating the attack, the attacker can use a fake address
but does not change it dynamically. If an attacker changes its address quite often, a
neighboring monitor mechanism can identify this misbehavior effectively.
Wireless communication is fundamentally untrusted. We do not place any trust
assumptions on the communication infrastructure. We do not assume nodes using
trusted hardware either. This model is still impractical in many situations and secu-
rity problems under this assumption are much simpler. The network can be secured
through a network-wide shared secret key for all message encryption and authentica-
tion.
2. Network Model
We model the network as an undirected graph G. A graph G = (V, E) consists of
a set of n nodes (vertices) and a set of m node pairs (edges). The set of nodes,
denoted by V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, represents the network-enabled ad hoc devices; the set
of edges, denoted by E, represents the wireless communication links. Each link (i, j)
is bidirectional and connects node i and j. Link (i, j) is removed when the distance
between node i and j is greater than the radio transmission range, while a new link is
formed when their distance is less than or equal to the radio transmission range. The
topology of G is constantly changing, as is the set of E. In this model, the neighbor
set of a node v is defined as a set of those nodes that have links to v.
B. Threat Model
Since routing protocols are the cornerstone of MANETs, this research will focus on
the detection of attacks targeted at MANET routing protocols, more specifically
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on detecting one of the most important active attacks: routing disruption attacks.
Routing disruption attacks are particularly harmful to the whole network. It is deemed
as one of the most vicious attacks and has been studied broadly by other researchers.
In this section, we use DSR as the exemplary routing protocol to model the behavior
of the routing disruption attack.
1. Basic Operations of DSR
We use the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol [6] as our exemplary routing
protocol throughout this research due to its popularity in MANET community. The
DSR routing protocol also defines a number of optimizations (such as preventing route
reply storm, path state and flow state mechanisms, piggybacking on route discoveries
and gratuitous route errors etc.). For simplicity, we only use a basic version of DSR
without optimizations throughout this research. With modest revision, however, our
proposed ZBIDS is applicable to DSR with more complicated functionalities. Since
routing protocols such as DSR have not been standardized and no routing protocol
seems to be an obvious winner for ad hoc networks in a short time, we leave the work
of expanding the proposed intrusion detection scheme as further work.
DSR uses the source routing approach (every data packet carries the whole path
information in its header) to forward packets. Before a source node sends data packets,
it must know the total path to the destination. Otherwise, it will initiate a route
discovery procedure by flooding a Route REQuest (RREQ) message. The RREQ
message carries the sequence of hops it passed through in the message header. Any
nodes that have received the same RREQ message will not broadcast it again. Once
an RREQ message reaches the destination node, the destination node will reply with
a Route REPly (RREP) packet to the source. The RREP packet will carry the path
information obtained from the RREQ packet. When the RREP packet traverses
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backward to the source, the source and all traversed nodes will know the route to the
destination. Each node uses a route cache to record the complete route to desired
destinations. Route failure is detected by the failure of message transmissions. Such
a failure will initiate a route error message to the source. When the source and the
intermediate nodes receive the error message, they will erase all the paths that use
the broken link from their route cache.
2. Routing Disruption Attack
Fig. 2 illustrates one example of the routing disruption attacks.
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Fig. 2. An Example of the Routing Disruption Attack.
In the example, node 1 is the attacker and node 3 is the attack objective. Node
1 actively sends randomly-constructed, falsified RREP (Routing REPly) packets to
node 3. The purpose is to effectively disrupt the routing logic of the victims, or
even the whole network. The attacker may also try to induce the victim to form a
short path to it, forming a routing black-hole. Since DSR uses source routing, the
randomly constructed RREP needs to contain the path 1 → 5 → 3 in order to reach
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the destination. To do so, the attacker may initiate a route discovery procedure first
to node 3, and based on the received RREP packet, the attacker can obtain a valid
path. Thus, the path contained in the randomly constructed RREP may look like:
{2, 4, 9, 7, 1, 5, 3}. Although the part {2, 4, 9, 7} are randomly constructed, the valid
partial path {1, 5, 3} can guarantee that this fake RREP can reach node 3. When
this fake RREP is unicasted to node 3, all nodes along the path (node 5) and their
neighbors (for example, node 2, 4, 7, 8) become victims due to the wireless broadcast
nature and the enabled promiscuous-listening mode in the nodes. All victims will
change their routing caches according to the newly received or promiscuously heard
RREP packets. The victims could further disseminate this falsified routing informa-
tion because it is assumed to reflect the current network topology. This attack can
have a serious negative impact on the routing logic of the whole network.
The occurrence of this type of attack does not limit to the normal route discovery
procedure. One obvious difference in the routing disruption attack between wired
networks and MANETs is that: when a node moves, it is hard for the node to be
targeted all the time. In the above example, the movement of node 3 may lead to
the link break between node 5 and 3. Therefore node 3 may fail to receive falsified
RREPs from node 1. This will lead to the phenomenon that a node is “partially”
victimized during the whole intrusion session and it becomes more obvious with the
increase of mobility.
Because mobility is arbitrary, it is very difficult to establish a mathematical
model to characterize this kind of attack. One important assumption of intrusion
detection is that normal and intrusive behaviors are distinct. If the attacker only
sends one or two falsified routing control packets, it is very difficult for the victim
to tell whether these falsified routing control packets are caused by mobility induced
errors or generated by attackers, based only on local communication activities. Also,
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sending only a few falsified routing control packets may not cause a serious impact
on the whole network, considering the periodic route cache refreshment mechanism.
What’s more, it has been demonstrated that mobility can be utilized to propose new
mechanisms to enhance security [63], thus reducing the attacker’s ability to perform
light attacks. Therefore, in the context of intrusion detection, we assume that an
attacker has to send many falsified routing control packets in order to effectively
disrupt the routing logic of the network.
C. Zone-Based Intrusion Detection System (ZBIDS)
In this section, we detail our proposed intrusion detection system - ZBIDS. From the
system aspect, we attach an IDS agent to each mobile node. These IDS agents run
independently and monitor local activities to detect abnormal behaviors. We choose
to implement an anomaly detection algorithm because it is expected that more types
of attacks will be launched against MANETs in the future. It is also difficult to
obtain the complete trace of the attacks, which are often required in designing a
misuse detection algorithm.
We logically divide the network into nonoverlapping zones to manage the locally
generated alerts. By integrating the network information from a wider area, this
management framework could reduce false positive ratio and improve detection ratio.
Therefore, the description of ZBIDS mainly consists of two parts: the overall
network framework and the internal conceptual model of each IDS agent.
1. ZBIDS Framework
We adopt a zone-based intrusion detection framework because of the following con-
siderations:
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• Due to the dynamic nature of MANETs, alert flooding is expected in such an
environment. Attacks are likely to generate multiple related alerts. By creating
some alert concentration points, we can logically group related alerts together
and reduce the false alarms generated for various reasons.
• Flat architecture is undesirable in managing the alerts. When the network
becomes very large, scalability will be a serious problem. It is also unrealistic
to have a centralized console in MANETs to manage all of the alerts because
of the complicated mobility management and the issue of network reliability
caused by the single point of failure.
A problem with a hierarchical approach in MANETs, however, is the cost of
maintaining the hierarchy in face of mobility. When mobility is high, the introduction
of the message overhead to create and maintain the hierarchy is unbearable.
We thus adopt a nonoverlapping zone-based framework because the communica-
tion overhead for creating and maintaining the topology is small [47]. It also requires
little mobility management efforts. Actually, ZBIDS requires few extra control mes-
sages propagated within the zone in order to maintain the framework. Nevertheless,
the selection of the zone size is critical and depends on factors such as node mobil-
ity, network density, transmission power and propagation characteristics, etc. The
zone size should be neither too large nor too small. Large zone size compromises
the advantage of using the hierarchical structure since the broadcast alerts may in-
volve large communication overhead. Likewise, if the zone size is too small, the alert
management nodes cannot collect enough information for aggregation.
The formation and the maintenance of zones are beyond the research topic in this
dissertation. In a simple approach, the zones can be obtained based on geographic
partitioning. Based on network connectivity, each node can be classified into one of
27
two categories: the interzone node (also called the gateway node) and the intrazone
node. With the availability of GPS, it is possible for a mobile host to know its
physical location. It can then determine its zone ID by mapping its physical location
to a zone map, which has to be worked out at the design phase. By some locally
broadcast mechanism (Hello messages, e.g.), each node can know the information of
its neighbors. Therefore it can determine whether it is an interzone node or intrazone
node. A node may change its role over time due to mobility. An example of ZBIDS
is depicted in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. The Zone Based IDS Framework for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.
In Fig. 3, nodes 4, 7 and 8 are the gateway nodes of zone 5. Each mobile node
is attached an agent, and all of these agents collaboratively perform the intrusion
detection task. Each IDS agent runs independently to monitor its system activities,
such as the user behavior, system behavior, radio communication activities, etc. and
perform intrusion detection tasks locally. Intrazone nodes will report their locally
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generated alerts to the gateway nodes in the same zone, and the gateway nodes will
aggregate and correlate the received alerts. Gateway nodes in neighboring zones can
further collaborate in order to perform intrusion detection tasks in a wider area.
Zhang et al. proposed an intrusion detection architecture [1], in which, only
neighboring nodes can collaboratively cooperate. When the network becomes very
large, scalability will become a serious problem. In order to solve this problem,
we adopt the zone-based architecture and introduce the concept of intrazone and
interzone nodes in MANET IDSs. There may exist many gateway nodes in a zone,
thus avoiding the issue of single point of failure.
Intrusion detection must necessarily be deployed in various layers of networks.
Certain attacks may be detected much earlier in the application layer, because it
contains richer semantic information than the lower layer. For example, for a denial-
of-service attack, the application layer may detect very quickly that a large number
of incoming service connections have no actual operations; whereas the lower layers,
which rely on information about the amount of network traffic (or the number of
channel requests), may take longer to recognize the unusually high volume.
This research focuses on the attacks targeted at the routing layer, thus our IDS
locates in the routing layer. It obtains data from routing caches to construct the
classifier. Because of the distributed nature of ZBIDS, the communications among
the IDS agents may rely on the underlying routing protocols.
In this research, we do not consider the following issues:
• We do not consider attacks targeted at the physical layer and Medium Access
Control layer. We focus on the routing attack and use it as the threat model to
develop our whole system. However, ZBIDS is general and can accommodate
attacks targeted at other layers easily.
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• We do not consider the formation and maintenance of zones. That is, we as-
sume that the network can be divided into nonoverlapping zones and the zone
partitioning mechanism is accurate and safe.
• We focus on the protection of MANETs. Preventing and detecting attacks
aimed at IDS itself will be another challenging research topic and is beyond the
discussion of this research. Therefore, we do not consider the security issues of
IDS agent itself.
In the following sections, we describe the local detection model and aggregation
algorithm used by the ZBIDS in detail.
D. Internal Model of the IDS Agent
The internal model of the IDS agent can be divided into the following components:
the data collection module, the detection engine, the local aggregation and correla-
tion engine (LACE), the global aggregation and correlation engine (GACE), and the
intrusion response module. A diagram is given in Fig. 4.
The data collection module is mainly responsible for collecting the security re-
lated data from various audit sources. The detection engine will use the data which
are parsed, filtered and formatted by the data collection module to perform intrusion
detection locally. LACE will locally aggregate and correlate the detection results
from different detection engines in the IDS agent. No detection model stands alone
as a catch-all for network penetrations. In an environment with high security re-
quirements, it is desirable to have multiple detection engines, which enable the use
of different detection techniques. They will complement each other to improve the
detection performance. The functionality of LACE is to combine the detection results
of different local detection engines. The functionality of GACE depends on the type
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Fig. 4. Diagram of an IDS Agent.
of mobile nodes. If the node is an intrazone node, GACE is mainly responsible for
transmitting the locally generated alerts to the gateway nodes in the same zone; if
the node is a gateway node, GACE is to aggregate and correlate the detection results
from the LACE of its own agent and the LACEs of the intrazone nodes in the same
zone, and to cooperate with the GACEs of the gateway nodes with which it has phys-
ical connections. The intrusion response module is to handle the generated alarms.
A detailed description of each module is as follows.
1. Data Collection Module
The functionality of the data collection module is to collect the security related data
from various audit data sources and preprocess them to conform to the input format of
the detection engines. There may exist many data collection modules in an IDS agent.
Each module is responsible for collecting data from a particular data source. There
are mainly two different data sources: network packets and host audit trails. Because
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this research is focused on the routing attacks, the data source mainly consists of the
routing activities, topological patterns and traffic changes, etc.
The data collection module consists of two layers: data filter layer and data
preprocess layer. The functionality of the data filter layer is to select a particular
security-related data source (the routing activities, e.g.) and generate the raw data.
The data preprocess layer defines the representational data input format for the de-
tection engine. It abstracts the raw data into a set of statistical variables in order
to reflect the network status and periodically generates reports following the format
required by the detection engine.
2. Detection Engine
Different detection techniques can be deployed in different detection engines in order
to improve the detection performance. Misuse-based detection techniques operate
based on the known attack scenarios and system vulnerabilities. Their main disad-
vantage is that they are only effective in detecting known attacks. It is expected that
many new different types of attacks can be mounted in MANETs, so anomaly based
detection techniques will play a main role in the MANET environment.
We try to avoid the use of computationally intensive detection techniques, such
as the powerful Hidden Markov Model [64], Hotelling’s T2 test [65], etc. which also
require a large memory to store the computed matrix. Mobile nodes have limited
power supply and storage space, thus excluding the possibility of such approaches.
Several types of anomaly detection techniques exist: string-based [21] [66],
statistical-based [14] [13], and specification-based [31], etc. They differ in the
format and the amount of available audit data as well as the modeling algorithms.
An advantage of statistical-based anomaly detection techniques is their capability of
explicitly representing and handling variations and noises involved in activities. In
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the training process, the established normal profile of the subject must consider and
represent variations of normal activities for distinguishing truly anomalous activities
from expected variations of normal activities. Due to arbitrary mobility of nodes,
MANETs are expected to demonstrate more dynamic activities. Therefore, we utilize
a statistical based anomaly detection approach - the Markov Chain based anomaly
detection algorithm to meet the challenge.
Details about how to construct the classifier are introduced in section E.
3. Local Aggregation and Correlation Engine (LACE)
Because different detection techniques can be deployed in the IDS agent, it is neces-
sary for the LACE to aggregate and correlate the different detection results before
transmitting them to the GACE.
The local IDS agents for a mobile node should be capable of operating in a stand-
alone mode and detect attacks against the node. Since wireless ad hoc networks are
constrained by bandwidth, energy consumption, and process capability, it is desirable
to correlate the alert information on the local nodes first, as opposed to transmitting
every alert across the network. The correlation could be very simple, for instance,
based purely on the source address.
4. Global Aggregation and Correlation Engine (GACE)
The functionality of the GACE depends on the node types: if the node is a gate-
way node, its GACE utilizes the aggregation and correlation algorithm to combine
the detection results from the IDS agents of intrazone nodes in the same zone and
neighboring gateway nodes. If the node is an intrazone node, the functionality of the
GACE is to distribute the outputs of its LACE to all of the gateway nodes in the
same zone.
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5. Intrusion Response Module
The countermeasures taken by the intrusion response module are different due to the
different intrusions, network services, applications and confidence in the evidence.
Possible countermeasures may include identifying the intruders, reinitiating the com-
munication channels and excluding the compromised nodes from the networks.
This research focuses on intrusion detection, i.e., the detection of whether the
network is under attack and the identification of the attackers. The functionality of
intrusion response is simplified.
E. Anomaly Detection in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Detecting new attacks while keeping acceptably low false positive ratio is probably
the most challenging and important problem in intrusion detection. In this section,
we detail the procedure of constructing the detection model.
1. Outline of the Methodology
We collect the statistical features of interest, Percentage of the Change in Route
entries (PCR) and Percentage of the Change in number of Hops (PCH), from the
routing cache of mobile nodes, which reflect the mobility of the network, to construct
a Markov Chain as the normal profile. The use of the Markov Chain can capture
the temporal dependency among the network activities. It also takes into account
their ordering property. Vector quantization (VQ) [30] approach is used in this
process to convert the continuous raw audit data to categorized data items with
minimum errors. The output of the VQ is then used to construct a Markov Chain
model, which employs conditional probabilities in its transition probability matrix
to represent the temporal profile of normal behavior. The Markov Chain model,
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considering the ordering property, characterizes the normal changes of the routing
caches with probabilities. It determines the probability of the next valid change, given
the previous N changes. The Markov Chain model is then turned into a classifier,
which serves as the detection algorithm. Conditional entropy is used in this process to
determine the proper window size which parameterizes the Markov Chain model, thus
avoiding the tedious trial-and-error process. The definition of conditional entropy and
window size will be given in the following sections.
In the detection process, we define the distance of the current transition based
on the transition probability matrix recorded in the Markov Chain model. A single
deviation from the Markov Chain does not always correspond to the occurrence of
an attack. An alert is generated only when the average distance over the near past is
beyond some preset threshold value. The parameters used in the detection algorithm
are tuned properly using the defined performance metrics.
We use an offline training process to generate the classifier. The general flowchart
of using the offline training process to construct a classifier is illustrated in the right
part of Fig. 5. The left part of Fig. 5 illustrates our corresponding strategy. The
dotted line depicts their mapping relationships.
IDSs are classifiers. Their purposes are to classify an unknown activity to nor-
mal or anomalous. Classifiers are usually offline trained from collected data. Their
purpose is to derive a set of rules which can be used during runtime. In the offline
training phase, features of interest are first collected and preprocessed using training
data whose classification is known a priori. The classification rules can then be de-
rived correspondingly [67] [68]. In our system, we offline generate a Markov Chain
to represent the subject normal behavior. Then we use normal data and abnormal
data to determine proper threshold and generate the classifiers. We will elaborate on
these issues in the remaining part of this chapter.
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2. Detailed Descriptions
In the following, we first give some definitions related to information theory [69],
then we describe how to construct the Markov Chain model and discuss how to use
it to construct the classifier.
Definition 1 Entropy: Suppose X is a dataset, Cx = {Cx[1], Cx[2], . . . , Cx[m]}
is a class set. Each data item of X belongs to a class x ∈ Cx[i]. Then the entropy of
X related to this |Cx|-wise classification is defined as:
H(X) =
m∑
i=1
−PilogPi.
where Pi is the probability of x belonging to class Cx[i].
Entropy is an important concept which is widely used in the field of communica-
tions. It can be interpreted as the number of bits required to encode the classification
of a data item. It measures the uncertainty of a collection of data items. The lower
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the entropy, the less varied the class distribution. If all data items belong to one
class, its entropy is 0, which means that no bits need to be transmitted because the
receiver knows that there is one class. The more varied the class distribution, the
larger the entropy. When all of the data items are equally distributed over the m
classes, its entropy is logm. In the context of anomaly detection, entropy could be
used as a measure of the regularity of audit data. Here regularity refers to the se-
quential dependencies of sequences. Nevertheless, because we often need to predict
the next state given the history information, conditional entropy is more useful in this
respect.
Definition 2 Conditional Entropy: Suppose X and Y are two datasets, Cx =
{Cx[1], Cx[2], . . . , Cx[m]} and Cy = {Cy[1], Cy[2], . . . , Cy[n]} are two class sets. Each
data item of X belongs to a class x ∈ Cx[i] and each data item of Y belongs to a
class y ∈ Cy[i]. Then given Y and Cy, the entropy of X related to Cx is defined as:
H(X|Y ) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pij log
1
Pi|j
where Pij is the probability of x ∈ Cx[i] and y ∈ Cy[j], Pi|j is the probability of
x ∈ Cx[i] given y ∈ Cy[j].
Conditional entropy describes the uncertainness of X given Y . The smaller the
conditional entropy, the more correlated X and Y . If X can be determined by Y ,
H(X|Y ) is 0. In the context of anomaly detection, conditional entropy can be used
to explore the temporal sequential characteristics of audit data due to the temporal
nature of system activities.
More history information is desirable in achieving better detection performance.
However, the more information we include in the detection model, the more data pro-
cessing time required and the more complexity of the data model. Window size is an
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important parameter to reflect how much information the data model includes. We
choose the proper window size when the conditional entropy of the training data asso-
ciated with the window size does not drop dramatically. We will have an experimental
description of how to decide window size in the next chapter.
Definition 3 Relative Entropy: The relative entropy or Kullback Leibler distance
between two probability mass function p(x) and q(x) is defined as
D(p ‖ q) = ∑ p(x)log p(x)
q(x)
Relative entropy can be used to as a metric to measure the “distance” between
two probability distributions, although it is not really a “distance”. Relative entropy
is always non-negative. In anomaly detection, we often build a model using the
training data and apply the model to test and intrusion data. It it better that
the “distance” between the training data and test data is small while the “distance”
between the training data and the intrusion data is large in order to make the detection
model achieve desirable performance. We will use relative entropy to demonstrate
PCR and PCH are good candidate features.
Definition 4 Classifier: Suppose ξ = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is a set of symbols. ξ∗ is a
set of finite traces which only consist of the symbols in ξ. λ = {Normal, Anomalous}.
Then in the context of intrusion detection, a classifier is a function f : ξ∗ → λ.
a. Feature Selection
Each intrusion detection approach is technically suited to identify a subset of the se-
curity violations to which the system is subject. The selection of statistical measures
should be based on good understanding about the system itself as well as all possible
attacks that may influence the system’s normal behavior. Different attacks may be
sensitive to different statistical features. Sometimes it requires domain expert knowl-
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edge to help select good features. In the history of IDSs, people have used various
features to construct detection models. They tend to define the normal behavior of
a user, a program, or a network element. Since the ground-breaking discovery of S.
Forrect [22], people find the short sequence of system calls of priviledged programs
is stable in building the detection model, many research efforts have been focused
on constructing different data models using the short sequence of system calls since
then.
Designing IDS in MANETs needs to define new features, as MANETs are a new
communication paradigm. These statistical features should be reliable in order to be
trusted and used. Due to the distributed nature of MANETs, these features should
also be locally collected. That is, they should be collected within the node itself
or its communication activities. Because we focus on routing disruption attacks, we
need to define features associated with the routing caches of mobile nodes in order to
characterize their normal changes.
In MANETs, each mobile node can act as a router to relay data for other nodes.
A routing table usually contains, at the minimum, the next hop to each destination
and the distance to the destination (in terms of the number of hops). For a given
application, we assume that the movement of each mobile node is independent and
each node has its own specific behavior regarding movement. In typical mobile net-
works, nodes exhibit some degree of regularity, i.e., non-random behaviors, in their
mobility patterns. For example, a car traveling on a road is likely to follow the path
of the road and a tank traveling across a battlefield is likely to maintain its head-
ing and speed for some period of time. As such, the mobile nodes tend to follow
regular movement characteristics which are usually determined by specific MANET
applications. As nodes in the network move in and out of wireless transmission range
of one another, the routing cache of the nodes changes correspondingly, invalidating
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Table I. Features Used
PCR Percentage of the change in route entries
PCH Percentage of the change in number of hops
old cached routing information or adding new routing entries: adding new routing
entries when RREP packets are received; deleting mobility-induced routing entries
when RERR packets are received; deleting expired routing cache entries when they
are not used for a long time; updating the routing cache when a node promiscuously
hears RREP/RERR/data packets, etc. Therefore, we define the normal updates of
routing information as the normal profile.
Specifically, based on our experiment results, we use the features described in
Table I that are sensitive to routing disruption attacks.
In DSR routing protocols, each entry contains a full path to the destination.
Two routing entries are the same if the full paths contained in the route entries are
the same. This includes the route destination and the hop-by-hop route comparison.
It is undesirable to consider only the route destination to distinguish two routes.
According to the specification of DSR [6], for a given node, it is possible that there
exist multiple routes to a destination (this is called path redundancy). If we only
consider the route destination to distinguish two routes, this may not be desirable
because it will only demonstrate a very small portion of the route cache changes.
Suppose for a given node, at time t1, there are N1 routing entries, the routing
entry set is S1, and the sum of hops of all routing entries is H1; at time t2, there are
N2 routing entries, the routing entry set is S2, and the sum of hops of all routing
entries is H2. We define PCR and PCH as following:
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• PCR: PCR is calculated as (|S2 − S1| + |S1 − S2|)/|S1|. |S| indicates the
number of elements in S. (S2− S1) means the newly increased routing entries
during the time interval (t2 − t1), and (S1 − S2) means the deleted routing
entries during (t2− t1). They together represent the changes of routing entries
in (t2− t1).
• PCH: PCH is calculated as (H2−H1)/H1. (H2−H1) indicates the changes
of the sum of hops of all routing entries during the time interval (t2− t1).
For traces at each mobility level, we further measure the relative entropy between
training data and test normal data (denoted as REtest henceforth) and the relative
entropy between training data and intrusion data (denoted as REintrusion henceforth)
in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of PCR and PCH. Relative entropy is a
measure of the “distance” between two probability mass functions [69]. For anomaly
detection, in order to achieve high performance, REtest should be small (indicating
the same or similar regularity between training data and test normal data) while
REintrusion should be large (indicating different regularity between training data and
intrusion data) [70][71].
Intrusion detection needs to consider subject behavior in recent history. There-
fore, for test data and intrusion data, we use the limited sample size which reflects
its recent subject activities. For a sample of size n, if the number of occurrence of an
item c is nc, the probability of c is calculated as nc/n. Because of the large amount
of training data and limited test data (intrusion data) items, it is possible that some
item appearing in training data does not appear in test data. Therefore, based on
the definition of relative entropy, we cannot calculate the divergence of these two
probability distributions because the denominator is 0. To cope with this problem,
we adopt the popular Jelinek-Mercer smoothing method [72] to eliminate the zero-
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frequency problem. That is, for item c, if its probability is 0 in test data (intrusion
data), we use the following formula to modify its probability:
pλ(c) = λq(c) + (1− λ)p(c), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
where q(c) is the probability of c in test data (intrusion data) for a given history,
and p(c) is the probability of c calculated from training data. λ is an interpolation
coefficient which is applied as a balancing weight between the observed probabil-
ity in test data (intrusion data) and the probability calculated from training data.
Simulation results of relative entropy will be illustrated in section a.
We do not use features related to the physical movement of nodes (such as the
velocity, direction and moving distance). In the context of our threat model, the
attackers can still attack the network following their normal movements.
We have two alternatives when collecting raw feature values: periodic and event-
triggered. We say an event happens each time the node receives a packet that triggers
the update of the routing entry. For the event-triggeredmechanism, the data collection
module computes PCR and PCH each time an event happens. This mechanism could
capture all route changes and therefore is more accurate to reflect the routing cache
statistics. However, when data are collected this way, we may need to keep track of
all events (RREP/RERR/data packets, etc.) and their time. The burst of events may
make their processes a heavy burden for mobile nodes. This is further complicated by
the time calculation. Therefore, it is difficult for event-triggered mechanism to meet
the demands of MANET IDSs.
Therefore, we adopt a periodicmechanism. We collect the raw feature value every
observation period, which determines the detection resolution. The data collection
module of each IDS agent periodically collects data and preprocesses these statistical
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measures into suitable formats. In this way, the temporal behavior of the routing
activities can be represented as a discrete-time stochastic process.
b. Data Preprocess
The output of the data collection module contains only continuous data. However, the
construction of the Markov Chain model requires discrete data. A suitable mechanism
is thus needed to perform the data transformation.
One simple approach is to use n classes to represent raw audit data in n ranges.
The range level can thus be simply defined based on the minimum and maximum
value of raw data. However, this approach does not take into account the attributes
of raw data and could possibly introduce high error rates. Too small number of bins
will make the bins too “coarse”, which will enable most values to reside in one or
two bins. This will result in less sensitivity to intrusions. On the other hand, too big
number of bins tend to be too “fine”, so that many values would be associated with
very small probabilities. The inappropriate selection of the number of bins would
influence the performance of the IDS.
We thus propose to use the Vector Quantization(VQ) algorithm [30] to discretize
the raw continuous data. VQ is a lossy data compression method based on the
principle of block coding. In VQ algorithm, each input vector is mapped to one
of a finite set of predetermined vectors. This set of predetermined vectors, called
codevectors, is the codebook. Given a vector source (corresponding to raw training
data) and a distortion measure (we use the commonly used squared-error distortion
measure), it outputs a codebook and a partition of training data that will result in
the smallest average distortion.
Let’s assume training data consists of M source vectors:
T = {x1, x2, . . . , xM}.
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In our context, they are the one-dimensional data (PCR or PCH) periodically
obtained from the routing caches of the mobile nodes. M is assumed to be sufficiently
large so that the statistical properties of the source are captured in the training
sequence. Suppose each source vector is k-dimensional:
xm = (xm,1, xm,2, . . . , xm,k), m = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
Let N be the number of codevectors which make up the codebook C,
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cN},
Each codevector is also k-dimensional,
cn = (cn,1, cn,2, . . . , cn,k), n = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Let Sn be the encoding region associated with the codevector cn and let
P = {S1, S2, . . . , SN}.
denote the partition of the space. If the source vector xm is in the encoding
region Sn, then its approximation (denoted by Q(xm)) is
cn: Q(xm) = cn, if xm ⊆ Sn.
Because we use the commonly used squared error (d(x, x) = (x− x)2, where x is
the approximation of x) as the distortion measure, the average distortion is given by:
Dave =
1
Mk
M∑
m=1
‖ xm −Q(xm) ‖2,
where ||y|| = (y1)2 + (y2)2 + ... + (yk)2.
The VQ algorithm can be described as: given T and N , find C and P such that
Dave is minimized. C and P , as the solution to the problem, must satisfy the following
two criteria:
• Nearest Neighbor Condition: Sn = {x :‖ x − cn ‖2≤‖ x − cm ‖2, ∀m =
1, 2, . . . , N}. This condition says that the encoding region Sn should consist of
all source vectors that are closer to cn than any of the other codevectors.
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• Centroid Condition: cn = ∑xm⊆Sn Xm/
∑
xm⊆Sn 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , N . This
condition says that the codevector cn should be the average of all those training
vectors that are in the encoding region Sn.
Unfortunately, designing a codebook that best represents the set of input vectors
is NP-hard. We therefore resort to the suboptimal codebook design schemes - the
Linde-Buzo-Gray (LBG) algorithm [73]. The LBG VQ algorithm works iteratively to
find the codebook C and the partition S of training data to guarantee local optimality
by comparing each input vector with all the codevectors.
After we obtain the codebook C, we need to find the mapped value for each raw
data item. We find it in this way: for each data item x, we map the codevector in
the codebook which has the smallest distance (measured as the (x−Q(x))2) to x. In
this way, the raw data are converted into categorized data.
In our case, we use the 1-dimensional input and construct separate codebooks
for different features (PCR and PCH). The input raw data items are thus converted
into categorized items suitable for the construction of the Markov Chain model.
Due to the dynamic nature of MANETs, nodes may move in an arbitrary man-
ner. It is thus possible that the statistical feature could have unexpected sudden
changes, leading to the small probability of some categorized data items. These cat-
egorized values are abnormal yet not malicious. They are undesirable in the Markov
Chain construction process because they do not represent the general normal changes
of the routing caches and introduce noise to training data. Their existence could
introduce unnecessary states and lead to the distortion of the Markov state transition
calculation. We thus take the following action to cope with this problem: for those
data items whose probability is below some threshold, we convert them to a “rare”
symbol. In this way, the noise in the training data could be reduced. We will detail
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this in the next chapter.
The whole process of using VQ algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Data Preprocess Using Vector Quantization.
c. Markov Chain Based Intrusion Detection
In [35], using the classification algorithm RIPPER [74], and the most discriminating
feature values as the concept, classification rules can be obtained and used to construct
normal profiles. This approach requires examples of abnormal behavior. However,
it is difficult to obtain sufficient examples of malicious behavior that compromise
system security. Leaving aside the practical difficulty of obtaining instances of hostile
activities, there is an issue of coverage. The space of possible malicious behavior is
potentially infinite. It would be difficult to demonstrate complete coverage of the
space from a finite training corpus.
We utilize a Markov Chain based anomaly detection algorithm. It characterizes
the normal behavior of the system and captures the characteristics of the temporal
sequence of the system audit data by utilizing which states it moves between and
with what probabilities.
That is, we define the from state as {Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xi+w−1}, and to state as
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{Xi+w} (w is a parameter that characterizes the Markov Chain). Therefore, we can
consider the routing changes as a random process with stationary transition probabil-
ities. We use the VQ algorithm to preprocess the data and introduce “rare symbol”
to construct a Markov Chain which would lead to better results in our environment.
Locality frame is also used in the classifier construction. We also adopt a different
approach to tune the parameters.
A Markov Chain is a special type of discrete-time stochastic process. If a collec-
tion of random variables Xt (where the index t runs through 0, 1, . . .) has the property
that:
• the probability distribution of the state at time t+1 only depends on the state
at time t;
• the state transition from time t to time t+1 is independent of time;
The sequence of states Xt forms a Markov Chain.
In other words, P (Xt = j|X0 = i0, X1 = i1, . . . , Xt−1 = it−1) = P (Xt = j|Xt−1 =
it−1) and P (Xt = it|Xt−1 = it−1) = P (Xt = j|Xt−1 = i) = pij .
If the system has a finite number of states, the Markov Chain model describes a
transition probability matrix:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p11 p12 ... p1s
p21 p22 ... p2s
...
...
...
...
ps1 ps2 ... pss
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(3.1)
where s is the number of possible states and
s∑
j=1
pij = 1. (3.2)
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Assume (X1, X2, . . . , Xt) gives a time-series representation of a given event se-
quence, where Xt denotes an event occurring at time t. We compute the transition
probability matrix as follows:
pij =
Nij
Ni
(3.3)
where
• Nij is the number of observation pairs Xt and Xt+1 with Xt in state i and Xt+1
in state j;
• Ni is the number of Xt in state i.
Normal profiles are used to characterize the normal behavior of the system. One
of the difficulties using the Markov Chain to construct the normal profile is to define
the states. Here we define the from-state as the previous N ordered values of the
statistical measure and the to-state as the current statistical feature value. That
is, we define the from-state as {Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xi+w−1}, and to-state as {Xi+w} (w
is a parameter that characterizes the Markov Chain.). If the transition probability
P [Xn+1 = j|Xn = i] of the Markov Chain is the same for every n, we say that
the Chain has stationary transition probabilities or has the homogeneity property
[75] [76]. Therefore, we can consider the routing changes as a random process with
stationary transition probabilities.
d. Construction of the Markov Chain Model
Before we describe how to construct the Markov Chain model, we first describe some
related notations. Let ξ denote the set of symbols. A trace over ξ is a finite sequence
of symbols. The set of finite traces over ξ is denoted as ξ∗ and the set of traces
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Table II. Variable Notations
ξ the set of symbols ξ∗ the set of finite traces over ξ
ξw the set of traces of length w |ψ| the length of trace ψ
ζ trace of test/anomalous data ψ a trace of training data
M the set of traces formatted w the window size
from raw audit data
of length w is denoted as ξw. Given a trace ψ over ξ, |ψ| denotes its length. We
summarize the notations of variables in Table II.
The size of ξ (the number of different symbols) is determined by the number of
codevectors. Each codevector is represented by one symbol. Each from-state in the
Markov Chain model is associated with a sequence of symbols, which is defined on
ξ ∪ {φ} and its length is w. Each tuple (s, s′) is a state pair that represents the state
transition from s to s′. All states are stored in one hash table H . The use of the
hash table is to speed up the processing and is not crucial to the description of the
algorithm. Each state and transition is associated with a counter, which indicates
how many times this state or transition has occurred.
Each training trace is converted into a sequence of symbols over ξ. All of the
sequences of symbols construct M ∈ ξ∗. The algorithm used to construct the Markov
Chain model from M is illustrated in Fig. 7.
In Fig. 7, the initial from state of the Markov Chain model is associated with a
symbol sequence of length w consisting of the first w symbols of ψ. w is window size,
which indicates the number of symbols associated with from state. For each trace ψ,
it sets from state and to state. If the from state is not in hash table H , it is inserted
into H and associated with a counter 1. If the from state is already inserted into hash
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Procedure Construct_Markov() 
 
Input   D: raw data set; 
Output  H: hash table that stores the states and the associated counters; 
 
Begin 
 
Use VQ algorithm to preprocess D; 
Generate rare symbols, and convert D to a set of traces, denoted as M; 
 
For each ψ ∈ M  
{ 
from_state is set to the first w symbols of ψ; 
shift ψ left by w positions; 
 
While (not reaching the end of ψ) 
 { 
  to_state is set to the first symbol in ψ; 
  shift ψ left by one position; 
 
  If (from_state ∉ H) 
  { 
   from_state → H; 
   the counter of from_state in H is set to 1; 
  } 
  Else 
   increase the counter of from_state by 1; 
  
  If (transition(from_state, to_state) ∉ H) 
  { 
   (from_state, to_state) → H; 
    
   the counter of (from_state, to_state) is set to 1; 
  } 
  Else 
   increase the counter of (from_state, to_state) by 1. 
 
  shift from_state left by one position; 
  append to_state to the end of from_state; 
 
 } /*for While*/ 
} /*for For*/ 
 
End. 
Fig. 7. Pseudocode to Construct the Markov Chain Model.
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table H , its associated counter is increased by 1. If the transition(from state, to state)
is not in hash table H , it is inserted into H and associated with a counter 1. If the
transition(from state, to state) is already inserted into hash table H , its associated
counter is increased by 1. We can imagine H is constructed using a window of size w
sliding through the trace ψ, each time by one position.
After all the traces in the training set have been processed, hash table H are
constructed. They store the possible normal states and their transitions respectively.
Each state and transition are associated with a positive integer. The probability of
the transition (s, s′) in H is calculated as:
P ((s, s′)) =
N((s, s′))
N(s)
where N((s, s′)) is the counter associated with the transition (s, s′), and N(s) is
the counter associated with the state s. The higher probability the transition (s, s′),
the more likely this transition is normal. An intrusive transition is expected to receive
a low probability of support from the Markov Chain model of the normal profile.
Because from-state is denoted as {Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xi+w−1}, and to-state is denoted
as {Xi+w}, we can see that the probability transition matrix is the same if we denote
the to-state as {Xi+1, . . . , Xi+w−1, Xi+w}. We can then depict a simple example in
Fig. 8 to illustrate how the Markov Chain model is constructed from the training
traces. Here we assume the window size is 3 and the set of input training traces are
{xxxyz, xxxzy}
Fig. 8 also shows the counters associated with the states and the transitions.
Based on the algorithm described in Fig. 7, the Markov Chain model can be
denoted using a tuple {S, P, s0}, where S is the set of all possible states, P : (S×S) →
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Fig. 8. A Simple Example to Illustrate How to Construct Makov Chains.
+ is the set of transition probabilities, s0 ∈ S is the initial state of the constructed
Markov Chain model and + denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. It is
obvious that P satisfies the following:
∑
s′∈Next(s)
P ((s, s′)) = 1, ∀s ∈ S.
where Next(s) denotes the set of to state associated with s.
e. Constructing Classifiers Using the Markov Chain Model
Suppose ζ ∈ ξ∗ is a trace converted from the raw system audit data. lζ = {δ1, δ2, . . . ,
δm−w+1} is the sequence of symbols corresponding to ζ , where δ1 = [ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζw]︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
,
δk = (ζk, ζk+1, . . . , ζk+w−1), δk ∈ ξw, m = |ζ |. The algorithm using the Markov Chain
model (MC) to construct the classifier is described in Fig. 9.
The algorithm first initializes two real numbers A and B to 0. δi, the from state,
is obtained after repeatedly shift ζ left by one position from its beginning. If the tran-
sition (from state, to state) exists in MC, A is increased by 1 and B increases by F =
1−P (from state, to state). Therefore, F sums up all of the probabilities of the tran-
sitions from the from state that are not equal to the current (from state, to state).
If the transition does not exist in MC, A is increased by 1 and B is increased by
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Procedure Markov_to_Classifier(MC, ζ) 
 
Input:  MC: constructed markov chain; 
  ζ: a trace; 
Output:  Normal or Anomalous; 
 
Begin 
 
i = 1; A = 0; B = 0; µ (ζ) = 0; 
 
While ( i < the length of ζ) 
{ 
 from_state is set to sequence δ[i] = (ζ[i], ζ[i+1], …ζ[w+i-1]);  
to_state is set to ζ[w+i]; 
 If (transition(from_state, to_state) is in MC) 
 { 
     A = A + ∑
∈ )_(
),_(
statefromNexts
sstatefromP
 = A + 1; 
    /*Next(from_state) indicates all the to_state associated with the current 
from_state*/ 
B = B + ∑
≠∧∈ )_()_(
),_(
statetosstatefromNexts
sstatefromP
 
= B + 1 - )_,_( statetostatefromP  
 } 
 else      
/* (from_state, to_state)
 
is not the transition of MC */ 
 { 
     A = A + 1; 
     B = B + z; 
 } 
 
           Adjust A and B over the past locality frame; 
 
 i++; 
 µ(ζ) = B / A; 
 If (µ(ζ) >= r) 
  Return Anomalous; 
 
} /*for While*/ 
 
Return Normal; 
 
End.  
Fig. 9. Pseudocode of Using the Markov Chain Model to Build the Classifier.
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the penalized value z. After each calculation, if B/A exceeds a preset threshold value
r, ζ is considered containing malicious activities (return Anomalous). A and B are
also updated after each calculation to accommodate the locality frame scheme. This
requires the deletion of the oldest value, and the addition of the newest value. The
usage of the hash table here could speed up the state and transition searching. A
well designed hash table takes O(1) time on average. Therefore, this algorithm can
be executed efficiently.
Several parameters, such as the penalized value z and the alert threshold r, will
be determined later through experiments. Here, a simple analysis of this algorithm
is performed because it needs to be executed online in reality.
In Fig. 9, a hash table is used to maintain MC and its transition probability
matrix. We skip the description of hash table and its hash function here. Interested
readers could refer to [77]. In a hash table in which collisions are resolved by chaining,
if the number of hash-table slots is at least proportional to the number of elements in
the table and the hash function satisfies the assumption of simple uniform hashing,
searching takes O(1) time on average. In practice, division method (a key k interpreted
as a natural number is mapped into one of m slots by taking the remainder of k
divided by m) could be used as the hash function. Therefore, the time complexity
of this algorithm depends on the length of the audit trace. We can see that given a
well-designed hash table, this algorithm can be executed efficiently.
We derive our online measure r, or the alert threshold, from the number of
mismatches occurring in a temporally local region, called a locality frame. At each
point in our test trace, we check whether the current transition exists in the Markov
Chain model, and keep track of the updated alert signal (defined as B/A) over the
past locality frame. The B/A over the past locality frame are aggregated into the
alert signal, as described in Fig. 9.
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Different selections of A, B, and the alert threshold r will result in different
detection models. Intuitively, the metric B/A measures how well the Markov Chain
model predicts the trace ζ , e.g., a lower B/A indicates that the Markov Chain predicts
the trace well. For simplicity, we will use
A = A +
∑
s∈Next(from state)
P (from state, s) = A + 1;
B = B+
∑
s∈Next(from state)
∧
s =to state
P (from state, s) = B+1−P (from state, to state);
where Next(from state) denotes the set of to state associated with this from state.
In this definition, B sums up all of the probabilities of the transitions from the
from state that are not equal to (from state, to state). When analyzing the trace
as in the While statement depicted in Fig. 9, if the transition (from state, to state)
has a low probability according to the constructed Markov Chain MC, it might
be an anomaly. Since B adds up all the probabilities of the transitions from the
from state that are not equal to (from state, to state), the small occurring proba-
bility of (from state, to state) will lead to relatively large B. In other words, if a
transition with a low probability occurs, B has a high value. Given the alert thresh-
old r, this indicates the higher probability to generate an anomaly. There may exist
different definitions of A and B to derive the “distance” of the current trace. This
will be a future research question.
The performance of the classifier constructed from the Markov Chain model
depends heavily on the parameter window size w and the alert threshold r. These
parameters need to be tuned properly in order to achieve good performance. As the
window size w increases, the algorithm depicted in Fig. 9 constructs a better model
because it considers more historical data. However, the classical overfitting problem
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will appear for a very large w because the constructed Markov Chain models the
training data “too well”. Given a hypothesis space H , a hypothesis h ∈ H is said to
overfit the training data if there exists some alternative hypothesis h′ ∈ H , such that
h has a smaller error than h′ over the training examples, but h′ has a smaller error
than h over the entire distribution of instances [78]. The possible random errors
or noise in the training data could lead to overfitting. Overfitting is a significant
practical difficulty for many learning approaches. As to the alert threshold r, the
determination of its value will also lead to different performance of the classifier. We
will have a detailed discussion of the parameter setting in Chapter IV.
We use the average distance over a locality frame to measure how well the trace
matches the Markov Chain. This finally determines the alert signal of the trace in
the near past. A locality frame is a length of a temporally local region over which
the alert signal is determined. That is, only when the average distance over the past
locality frame is larger than a predefined alert threshold at some point during the
intrusion will the IDS generate an alert.
The local detection mechanism used here could aggregate the mismatch counts
and is not sensitive to the trace length. Because of the dynamic nature of MANETs,
it is expected to have many variations involved in its activities. Our approach is
resilient to sudden abnormal changes, which is usually normal in MANET environ-
ments. Therefore our approach can avoid high false positive ratio due to the un-
expected sudden changes of the statistical measures. Because real intrusions tend
to produce anomalous sequences in temporally local clusters, our approach can still
achieve high detection ratio.
The relation among locality frame, window size and the state transition is illus-
trated in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 10. Illustration Among Locality Frame, Window Size and State Transition.
3. Parameter Tuning
Performance tuning is detailed in the experiment part. Here we discuss the guidelines
in deciding the suitable window size w, penalized value z and alert threshold r.
Tune the window size: Intrusion detection needs to consider the history of the
subject activities because of their temporal nature. A proper window size needs to
be determined. Different statistical measures will have different regularities under
different mobility patterns. We use the conditional entropy to measure the regularity
of the training data and help us to determine w.
Regularity refers to the sequential dependencies of sequences. Conditional en-
tropy measures how much uncertainty remains for the current event given the previous
N events. High-regularity data contain redundancies that facilitate predicting future
events based on past events, while low-regularity impedes prediction.
Let X be a collection of sequences where each is denoted as (e1, e2, . . . en), and
each ei is an audit event. Let Y be the collection of subsequences where each is
denoted as (e1, e2, . . . ek), and k < n, then the conditional entropy H(X|Y ) tells us
how much uncertainty remains for the rest of audit events in a sequence x after we
have seen y, i.e., the first k events of x (since y is always a subsequence of x, we
have P (x, y) = P (x).). For anomaly detection, the smaller the conditional entropy,
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the better the detection model. For example, if we have a sequence of audit events
of the same type, e.g., X = {aaaaaa, bbbbbb, ....}, then the conditional entropy is 0
and the event sequence is deterministic. If the conditional entropy is large, the audit
sequence is not deterministic and is hard to model.
Intuitively, the more information the data model contains, the better the detec-
tion performance. However, if too much information is included, not only the data
processing time, but also the model complexities will increase. Therefore, there is a
trade-off in determining the proper window size. We choose the window size w when
the conditional entropy parameterized by w does not drop dramatically. Audit data
of different mobility scenarios will have different conditional entropy values given the
same window size. This is one of the main reasons that different performance can be
observed under different mobility scenarios in our later experiments.
Tune the penalized value and alert threshold: After deciding the window size which
parameterizes the Markov Chain, two more important parameters are the penalized
value z, which is used by the classifier when a transition is not found in the Markov
Chain model, and the alert threshold r.
Let µ(α) = B/A be the metric defined earlier. Intuitively, it measures the
discrepancy between the Markov Chain model and the current trace. Smaller µ(α)
means a better fit of the current trace. For a normal trace α = {β1, β2, . . .}, the
discrepancy Dt(α) over the locality frame with length L is:
Dt(α) =
µL(α) + µL+1(α) + . . .+ µ|α|(α)
(|α| − L + 1) (3.4)
where µi(α) is the average µ over the locality frame {βi+1−L, βi+2−L, . . . , βi}, i ≥
L.
For a given normal trace set Tt, its discrepancy Dt(Tt) is:
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Dt(Tt) =
∑
α⊆Tt Dt(α)
|Tt| (3.5)
where |Tt| denotes the number of traces in Tt.
For a given trace α of intrusive activities, we define the discrepancy Da(α) over
the locality frame with length L as:
Da(α) = Max(µL(α), µL+1(α), . . . , µ|α|(α)). (3.6)
µi(α) has the same meaning as before. We use Max here because it is possible
that there are normal data mixed together with abnormal data due to the possible
intermittent trigger of the attacks.
For a given trace set Ta of intrusive activities, its discrepancy Da(Ta) is:
Da(Ta) =
∑
α⊆Ta Da(α)
|Ta| (3.7)
where |Ta| denotes the number of traces in Ta.
We tune the penalized value z until the separation (Da(Ta) − Dt(Tt)) between
the anomalous traces and the test data is above a certain threshold. This makes the
easy distinction between a normal trace and the trace of intrusive behavior.
After determining the penalized value z, a proper alert threshold value r should be
decided. If the alert threshold is set too low, then on an intrusive trace, the classifier
will generate an alert very quickly. However, a lower threshold also generates more
false alarms on normal traces, resulting in a high false positive ratio. If the alert
threshold is set too high, we can reduce the false positive ratio. However, we may risk
failing to detect an attack and the average detection time may be high. Therefore,
the value of the alert threshold is a trade-off. We use the following formula to decide
r:
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r = ht ∗Dt(Tt) + ha ∗Da(Ta)
where ht > 0, ha > 0, and ht +ha = 1. Therefore, r is the weighted sum between
Dt(Tt) and Da(Ta). For simplicity, we set r = (Dt(Tt) + Da(Ta))/2 in our later
experiments.
Due to the nature of statistical approaches, it is difficult to provide diagnostic
information to accurately analyze an attack. Therefore, the statistical procedure must
provide necessary information that can be used to identify the reason of an alarm.
In our implementation, each node records the number of routing control packets sent
from each node and their associated probability in each period. This information
could help to identify the reason of the attack and is necessary for the aggregation
algorithm described later.
In this section, based on the attack model, we describe a Markov Chain based
anomaly detector using PCR and PCH . It is a common sense that no detection
approach is suitable to detect all penetrations. Therefore, our method is expected to
complement with other approaches to address a comprehensive set of vulnerabilities.
F. Collaboration of IDS Agents
1. Introduction
In mobile ad hoc networks, the attackers can launch attacks when they are close to
the victims. Thus, in general cases, through the local IDS agent attached to the node
itself and/or neighboring nodes, these attackers can be detected. There are other
kinds of attacks, however, which the attackers may launch far away from the victims.
What’s more, two or more attackers may collude to launch attacks that are more
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complicated. In these situations, it is very difficult for the node itself to detect the
attacks. In addition, the result based on the local IDS agent could lead to a very high
false positive ratio.
We expect different approaches for local intrusion detection developed in the
future. Due to the local nature of the audit data, they generally tend to generate
many false positives and the alerts generated are trivial. Therefore, it is desirable to
collaborate different IDS agents which aim at different attacks in different environ-
ments. Their approaches are complementary and the results could be aggregated to
derive a global diagnosis of the attack. It is thus necessary to develop a framework
to manage these alerts, analyze and aggregate the alerts in a wider area. In this sec-
tion, we describe our work in designing and analyzing a nonoverlapping zone-based
management framework that fits the requirement to aggregate the alerts in a wider
area. We describe an aggregation algorithm that uses the similarity of attributes to
aggregate the alerts.
Because we lack detailed analysis of MANET attacks in the literature and so-
phisticated attacks may make the situations very complex, we only consider the same
occurrence of attacks. Specifically, we still target at the routing disruption attack.
The main objective of the aggregation algorithm and the zone-based framework
is to reduce false positive ratio and increase detection ratio by aggregating local
alerts. Global alerts could be generated to provide more diagnostic information of
the attacks.
Alert aggregation is a new research area in intrusion detection systems. Most
existing alert management systems develop their framework based on fully developed
wired IDSs, and carry out experiments based on misused based IDS like Snort [79],
e-Trust [80], etc. Because misuse based IDSs could provide more accurate and diag-
nostic information about the attack, this could greatly facilitate the alert aggregation
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and correlation. The extensive attack database of wired network could also provide
abundant attack scenarios for analysis.
The situation is different in MANETs. Due to the lack of detailed analysis of
attacks in MANETs, alert aggregation is very challenging in MANET environment.
Potential complex attack scenarios could make the aggregation very complicated.
What’s more, there are not many efforts that have been devoted to the local detec-
tion of MANET attacks. However, the distributed nature of MANETs makes alert
aggregation an indispensable and integral part of MANET IDSs. In this section, we
provide our initial work in this respect. We use our Markov Chain based anomaly
detection model as the local detection model and the routing disruption attack as the
attack model to demonstrate our aggregation algorithm.
2. Zone-Based Framework
In our nonoverlapping zone-based framework, it is necessary to maintain the stability
of the zone connectivity for the cooperation of neighboring gateway nodes. If any
two nodes are within the communication range, a physical link exists between them.
If there is at least one physical link connecting any two zones, a virtual link between
the two zones exists. When the number of physical connections between two zones
decreases from 1 to 0 or increases from 0 to 1 due to the movement of nodes, the
zone connectivity will change correspondingly. This can be mitigated by choosing
the appropriate zone size. The selection of the suitable zone size needs to make the
number of physical connections between two neighboring zones much bigger than
zero, thus making the logical connection of two zones stable.
a. Collaboration Mechanism
There may exist two possible mechanisms for the gateway nodes to collaborate.
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One is the subscription-based mechanism. It is not necessary that the gateway
nodes collect all of the security related information from the IDSs of intrazone nodes in
order to draw some conclusions. Based on its own status, the IDS of the gateway node
can send a subscription message to its intrazone nodes to subscribe security related
information. The subscription message could contain information that is related to
the required data. The intrazone nodes can thus generate corresponding messages
to fit the subscribed requirement. This mechanism introduces low communication
overhead. However, the gateway node needs to carefully analyze the messages in
order to determine what information is needed.
The other mechanism is the local broadcast mechanism. When the IDS of the
intrazone node generates a local alert, it could locally propagate the detection results
to the gateway nodes. When nothing is suspicious in the last period, there is no need
for the local IDS to propagate security information. The neighboring gateway nodes
could further collaborate through the transmission of the security-related information
by the beaconmessages. The rationale behind this mechanism is that: audit data from
other nodes cannot be trusted and should not be used because the compromised node
may send falsified data. However, the compromised nodes have no incentive to send
reports of intrusion detection because this may result in their expulsion from the
network. In this way, we avoid the use of global broadcast. It is also unnecessary
to propagate local alerts inside the zone every period. All these strategies can result
in less communication overhead. This is very desirable because message sending and
receiving is very expensive in terms of energy. This mechanism could also enable
gateway nodes to collect enough information to make final decisions. We thus adopt
the local broadcast mechanism in our implementation.
In the zone-based intrusion detection framework, only gateway nodes could gen-
erate alarms. The local IDS attached to local nodes could only generate alerts based
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on their local information and propagate these alerts inside the zone. The gateway
nodes, having gathered the alert information periodically, could make better final
decisions.
There may exist routing mechanisms enabling the intrazone node to disseminate
the locally generated alerts to its gateway nodes in a more efficient manner. However,
this is beyond the scope of this research.
3. Aggregation Mechanism
The purpose of the aggregation algorithm is to reduce false positive ratio and increase
detection ratio by aggregating local alerts and present a broad view of the reported
security issues. By grouping alerts together, aggregation will allow a better evaluation
of the progress of the attack. In order to do so, we need the definition of a data model
in the form of a class hierarchy to describe the alerts.
a. Class Hierarchy of the Alerts
The Intrusion Detection Working Group(IDWG) of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) develops the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format(IDMEF)[3],
which is intended as the standard to facilitate the inter-operability of commercial IDSs
and research prototypes. Intrusion detection systems can use this format to generate
the alert information. The IDMEF data model is an object-oriented representation
of the alert data and is described using the Unified Modeling Language(UML) [81].
UML defines entities as classes, which consists of class name and class attributes,
as depicted in Fig. 11. Currently, the IDMEF model uses only two of the rela-
tionship types defined by UML: inheritance and aggregation. Inheritance denotes a
superclass/subclass type of relationship where the subclass inherits all the attributes,
operations, and relationships of the superclass. Aggregation is a form of association
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in which the whole is related to its parts. The implementation of the IDMEF data
model uses the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) Document Type Definitions
(DTD). We use the definition and implementation method recommended by IDWG
to describe the alert classes used by ZBIDS.
Class Name
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute N
     
 
Fig. 11. Class Representation.
The IDMEF data model proposed by IDWG aims at wired IDSs. Its purpose is
to define common data formats and data exchange procedures for sharing informa-
tion of interest to intrusion detection systems. Due to the unique characteristics of
MANETs and because we focus on the intrusion detection targeted at the network
layer, we modify the IDMEF data model when designing the alert class. This includes
adding some new classes (Zone class, for example) and attributes related to MANETs,
deleting some unwanted classes (User class, Process class, etc.) and attributes, and
modifying the definition of some classes and attributes (Location attribute, etc.). The
alert class hierarchy for ZBIDS is depicted in Fig. 12 using the UML notation.
The alert class hierarchy depicted in Fig. 12 is general in ZBIDS. That is,
it can be used as both the input and output of the LACE and GACE for better
interoperability. When generating an alert, the detection engine formats it according
to the class hierarchy depicted in Fig. 12. We also implement each alert class using
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Alert
STRING ident
CorrelationAlert
Alertident
STRING
analyzerid
DetectTime
TIME time
CreateTime
TIME time
Analyzer
STRING
analyzerid
Target Source AnalyzerTime
STRING ident
ENUM decoy
STRING ident
ENUM
spoofed
Node
STRING ident
ENUM
category
Location Address Zone Name
float x
float y
STRING ident
ENUM
category
STRING address
STRING zoneId STRING name
Netmask
STRING
netmask
1..*
0..1 0..* 0..* 0..1
0..1 0..1 0..1
0..1 0..* 0..1
0..1
inheritance
aggregation
0..1:  zero or one
1..*:  one or more
0..*:  zero or more
n:  exactly "n" (left blank if n = 1)
float z
Classification
Assessment
1..*
0..1
ENUM
confidence
TIME time
 
Fig. 12. The Alert Class Hierarchy of ZBIDS.
XML DTD, as shown in Appendix B. In this section, we generate all of our local
alerts compliant with this format.
b. Aggregation Algorithm
The performance of the aggregation algorithm depends heavily on the performance of
the local detection model, the amount of information and the accuracy of the infor-
mation it provides. Existing aggregation algorithms assume the accurate information
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provided by the local IDSs, and the aggregation algorithms are alert-triggered [37]
[38] [39], i.e., the aggregation algorithms are triggered whenever a new alert is re-
ceived. Our cases are different. First, due to the lack of misuse based MANET IDSs,
we cannot assume the accurate identification of the attackers provided by the local
IDSs. Second, the gateway nodes execute the aggregation algorithm periodically. At
each time period, the aggregation algorithm aggregates the received local alerts and
makes final decisions. If there is no alert received in the last period, no action is
taken. This is computationally efficient since it avoids executing the algorithm every
time an alert is received. The possible alert burst may crash the gateway nodes.
Old gateway nodes can locally broadcast historical records. This can lead to
the quick learning of new gateway nodes and thus quick response to intrusion, but
requires more bandwidth cost. Also, a new gateway node can obtain information
quickly from local IDSs from their locally broadcasted alerts.
Each node has the LACE and GACE module. They use different sources as the
alert inputs: the input of the LACE is the local detection engines, while the input of
the GACE is either the local LACE (to intrazone nodes) or the intrazone nodes in
the same zone and the neighboring gateway nodes (to gateway nodes).
When a local node detects an anomaly, it could generate an alert based on the
proposed MANET IDMEF data model. This alert could contain the identification
of the node, the alert classification, the time information, and the information of
the routing control packets in the recent history that could contribute to the local
alerts. The routing control packets in a given time interval is not sufficient for the
intrusion detection. To our attack model, the local alert also includes the local history
of the aggregated routing control packets, i.e., how many routing control packets are
received and from which node the control packets are sent out. This could help the
gateway node make the final decision.
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Much information could be provided by the local alerts. The gateway node makes
decisions mainly based on the following information from the local alerts:
• Classification similarity: In the IDMEF format, the attack type description is
provided in the entity classification. In our context, two alerts are aggregated
only if their classification fields are the same, indicating the same occurrence
of attack. In our context, it should be “Routing Disruption”, which indicates
the routing disruption attack.
• Time similarity: Each local alert provides the information of routing control
packets in the past history. The entity DetectTime and CreateTime of IDMEF
could be used to provide time information. DetectT ime indicates the time
when the attack happens, and CreateT ime indicates the time when the attack
is detected. If the temporal difference between the CreateT ime of a newly
received local alert and the time of the gateway node exceeds some predefined
delay, this local alert is ignored.
• Source similarity: the source of the IDMEF data format indicates the possible
sources of the attack. In the context of our attack model, it is the IP address
of the attacker that actively propagates randomly constructed routing control
packets.
Source similarity plays an important role in the alert aggregation. In the normal
routing discovery procedure, if the intermediate nodes have the route to the destina-
tion, they could generate a RREP packet back to the traffic source. All nodes that
receive the route packets modify its routing cache correspondingly. For each received
or promiscuously heard RREP packet, the node records its source and destination
IP addresses. If there is no attacker in the network, the distribution of these source
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addresses in a given time period would be expected even, i.e., most of the time, there
is no bias for a given source address.
We introduce a parameter Prouting abnormal. If the proportion of routing control
packets from a certain address exceeds Prouting abnormal, it is abnormal and deserves
further investigation. We experimently set Prouting abnormal in our later experiments.
However, in normal cases, it is still possible that a node receives a high percentage
of routing control packets from some certain node in a period. This is reasonable if we
consider the route discovery procedure of DSR. This situation is enhanced by enabling
promiscuous-listening mode and is the main reason to cause the false positive alarms
of our aggregation algorithm.
When there exist attackers in the network, things are different. The attacker
would send many falsified routing control packets into the network. The local IDSs
of the victims, using the Markov Chain detection model described in the previous
section, could generate the alerts and record the source and destination distribution
of the routing control packets in the last period. The attacker’s address would dom-
inate the source distribution of the routing control packets. Having gathered this
information in the last period, the gateway nodes could know the source address
distribution of the routing control packets. If the probability of a particular source
address exceeds some predefined threshold P , this address is then identified as the
attacker’s address. Note that an attacker cannot use different IP addresses to send
out fake messages. Otherwise, it can be detected easily by its neighbors.
We now discuss how to decide P . The selection of P depends on attack intensity,
attacking time, node placement, etc. If the threshold P is low, the gateway nodes
could identify the attack more accurately, thus achieving higher detection ratios.
However, this could lead to high false positive ratios. If the threshold P is high, the
gateway nodes could miss the attack, but reduce the false positive ratio. We propose
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a simple approach to decide P in the following way.
In normal cases, for a given gateway node, if local alerts are received in a given
time period, we first pick those source addresses whose aggregated probability is larger
than Prouting abnormal. We denote these probabilities as Pti (i = 1, 2, . . . , nt).
Suppose for a given gateway node G, it has mt time periods in which it receives
local alerts, we compute the average of Pti , (i = 1, 2, . . . , nt) over these mt periods as:
PGt =
mt∑
j=1
nt∑
i=1
Pti/mt.
PGt represents, to gateway node G, the irregularity of the source address distri-
bution of the routing control packets when the system is at normal status. Given a
test trace, we compute its average over all gateway nodes:
Ptest =
∑
∀ gateway nodes
PGt
the number of gateway nodes
.
Given the trace of intrusive activities, we first compute the attack address dis-
tributions contained in the routing control packets. We denote these probabilities as
Pai (i = 1, 2, . . . , na).
Suppose for a given gateway node G, it has ma time periods in which it receives
local alerts, we compute the average of Pai , (i = 1, 2, . . . , na) over these ma periods
as:
PGa =
ma∑
j=1
na∑
i=1
Pai/ma.
PGa represents the source address distribution of the routing control packets in
the gateway node G during the attack time. Given the trace of intrusive activities,
we compute the average of PGa over all gateway nodes:
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Pattack =
∑
∀ gateway nodes
PGa
the number of gateway nodes
.
We set P as:
P = ht ∗ Ptest + ha ∗ Pattack,
where ht > 0, ha > 0, and ht + ha = 1. By adjusting ht and ha, we can get
a better trade-off between the false positive ratio and detection ratio. In our later
simulation study, ht an ha are set equal.
The pseudocode of setting P could be depicted in Fig. 13.
Having decided P , we can now describe the algorithm that a gateway node uses
to determine whether it should generate alarms in a given time period. When a
gateway node receives locally broadcast alerts in some period, it first sums up the
aggregated probabilities of those source addresses whose probability is larger than
Prouting abnormal. If the resultant value is less than P , the gateway node will not
generate alarms. Otherwise, the gateway node will generate alarms and provide
attacker information based on the probability distribution of source addresses.
It is possible that the detection sensitivity of the aggregation algorithm will
decline with the increase of the size of the attack group. Especially when the attackers
collude to attack at the same time and the attack objectives overlap. In this kind
of situation, for the attack objectives, there is no single address that dominates the
probability distribution of the source addresses of the routing control packets. This
could impact the detection ratio of the aggregation algorithm. However, it is still
possible that the attack victims do not overlap completely, whose attack address
probability distributions contribute to the effectiveness of our aggregation algorithm.
One example of this is depicted in Fig. 14.
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 Procedure Determine_P() 
Input: test trace, attack trace, Prouting_abnormal 
Output: P  
Begin 
Test trace: 
For each gateway node G 
PGt = 0; 
  For each time interval of G that receives local alerts 
     For all Pti
 
  
If Pti
 
> Prouting_abnormal 
  
then PGt
 
= PGt
 
+ Pti
 
     
End For 
End For 
/* mt is the number of time intervals of G that receives local alerts */ 
Ptest_sum = Ptest_sum + PGt/ mt 
End For 
/* Ntest is the number of gateway nodes that receive local alerts */ 
Ptest = 
testN
P
sumtest _
 
Attack trace: 
For each gateway node G 
  For each time interval of G that receives local alerts 
       Compute the sum of the probability of attacker source addresses PGa     
End For 
/* ma is the number of time intervals of G that receives local alerts */ 
Pattack_sum = PGa / ma 
End For 
/* Nattack is the number of gateway nodes that receive local alerts */ 
Pattack = 
attackN
P
sumattack _
 
P
 
= ht * Ptest + ha * Pattack. 
END 
Fig. 13. Pseudocode of How to Decide P.
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Fig. 14. One Example of Two Attackers.
In this example, node 1 and 8 are attackers, and the attack objective is node 5.
The probability distributions of 1 and 8 provided by node 5 would make it difficult for
the gateway node to detect the attackers. However, since the victims do not overlap
(the victims of node 8 are 5, 6, and 9, while the victims of node 1 are 2, 4, and 5),
they all provide information of 1 and 8. This could contribute to the detection of the
attack.
G. The Relation between Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention
In MANETs, intrusion prevention and intrusion detection techniques need to com-
plement each other to guarantee a highly secure environment. They play different
roles in different status of the network.
Intrusion prevention measures, such as encryption and authentication, are more
useful in preventing outside attacks. Considerable research has been done in prevent-
ing the misbehavior at the network layer.
Once the node is compromised, however, intrusion prevention measures will have
little effect in protecting the network. At this time, the role of intrusion detection
is more important. In mobile ad hoc networks, it is much easier to gain physical
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possession of the node. When a node is compromised, the attacker owns all its cryp-
tography key information. Therefore, encryption and authentication cannot defend
against a trusted but malicious user.
Intrusion detection research assumes that subject activities are observable, and
normal and intrusive activities have distinct behavior. Therefore, by identifying the
different behavior manifested by attackers, intrusion detection systems, serving as
the second wall of defense, could provide a complementary security mechanism to
MANETs.
Intrusion detection and intrusion prevention are not totally separated. For exam-
ple, it is possible that, in ZBIDS, the local IDS encrypts the generated local alert and
broadcast them to the gateway nodes using the network-wide shared secret among
the local IDS agents. This could prevent some compromised nodes from fabricating
alerts and enable the correct functionality of GACE.
H. Summary
In this chapter, we describe a Markov Chain based anomaly detection algorithm and
an aggregation algorithm for MANETs. Based on the locally collected statistical
measures that reflect the mobility of the network, a Markov Chain is constructed to
act as the normal profile, which is then used to build a classifier. Ordering property
is considered and the transition probability is used to define the distance of the trace
and the normal profile. The aggregation algorithm could further reduce the false
positive ratio and increase the detection ratio, which are demonstrated in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF ZBIDS
In order to study the feasibility and effectiveness of our detection algorithm and
validate our detection model, we carried out extensive simulation experiments using
various mobility scenarios. In this chapter, we first describe our simulation approach
and then present the simulation results of local IDS and ZBIDS respectively.
A. Simulation Model
1. Simulation Platform and Parameter Settings
We use a simulation model based on Parsec [4] and GloMoSim [5] to investigate the
performance of the proposed approaches. We choose DSR as the routing protocol
and the parameters used in the simulation are described in Appendix III.
Specifically, in our simulation, the channel capacity of mobile hosts is set to the
same value: 2 Mbps. We assume all nodes have the same transmission range of 250
meters. A free space propagation model with a threshold cutoff is used as the channel
model. In the free space model, the power of a signal attenuates as 1/r2, where r is
the distance between mobile hosts. In the radio model, capture effects are taken
into account. We use the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11
for wireless LANs as the MAC layer protocol. It has the functionality to notify the
network layer about link failures. We enable the promiscuous receive mode of nodes,
which enables every received packets delivered to the network layer.
In the simulation, 30 mobile nodes move in a 1000 meter X 500 meter rectangular
region. Compared with a square region, the rectangular region can enlarge the average
route length so that we can easily observe the performance difference in different
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scenarios. We assume each node moves independently with the same average speed.
Except otherwise indicated, the mobility model we use in this chapter is the Random
Waypoint model. In this mobility model, a node randomly selects a destination
from the physical terrain. It moves in the direction of the destination in a speed
uniformly chosen between the minimal speed and the maximal speed. After it reaches
its destination, the node stays there for a pause time and then moves again. In our
simulation, the minimal speed is 3 m/s, and the maximal speed is 5 m/s. We change
the pause time from 30 seconds to 900 seconds to investigate the performance influence
at different mobilities.
8 source-destination pairs are selected randomly to generate Constant Bit Rate
(CBR) traffic as the background traffic. The interval time for data transmission is
0.25 second. The size of all data packets is set to 512 bytes. A packet is dropped
when no acknowledgement is received after seven retransmissions or when there is no
buffer to hold the packet. The buffer size is set to 128 packets. All traffic is generated,
and the statistical data are collected after a warm-up time of 300 seconds in order to
give the nodes sufficient time to finish the initialization process. When we simulated
a routing disruption attack, the attacker is uniformly chosen from the 30 nodes.
2. Data Sets
The hardware we use to collect the data sets is SGI Origin 2000 with a 32-processor,
8 GB distributed-shared-memory. The operating system of it is IRIX 6.5.
In general, three kinds of data need to be generated: training data, testing data,
and intrusion data. We execute the application in as many normal modes as possible
while tracing its behavior. Specifically, we use different pause time (30S, 150S, 300S,
600S, 900S) to represent different mobility scenarios. At each mobility level, we
randomly select 4 different seeds. For a given mobility scenario and a given random
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seed, we run the simulation 400 minutes in order to get the normal data. In this way,
we get 5 × 4 = 20 normal data traces. For each of the data trace, we collect (PCR
and PCH) feature values every 3 seconds after a warm-up time period of 300 seconds.
We mix the same-mobility normal data of different nodes and different random seeds
together to generate the normal trace for a given mobility. From each normal data
trace, we use its last 40 minutes part as the testing data. The rest of the normal data
are used as the training data, and they are used to construct the Markov Chain model
and the classifier. Thus, altogether we have 20 training data and testing data traces.
For each mobility scenario, we have 4 training data and testing data respectively.
Each training data trace has 7074 data items and each testing data trace has 786
data items.
Because this research focus on the routing disruption attacks, we also simulate
this type of attack in order to get data of intrusive behaviors. Under the same mobility
scenario, we let the simulation run 10 minutes. For each run, we let the routing attack
script start at 500S, and the attack lasts 60S.
Training data are used to construct the local Markov Chain model. Testing data
and intrusion data are used to tune the parameters of the local classifier and the
aggregation algorithm. In order to evaluate the performance of ZBIDS, we further
generate a different set of normal and abnormal data.
Due to the mobility of nodes, it is possible that a node is only a “partial” victim
during the whole intrusion session. That is, the node only receives or promiscuously
hears part of the falsified routing control packets because of mobility-caused link
breakage. We use data traces of all of the victims, including both the “partial”
victims and “full” victims, to represent the intrusive behavior.
We use the LBG-VQ algorithm [73] to discretize the raw continuous data in
order to construct the Markov Chain model. Given each mobility scenario, feature
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value PCR and PCH are used respectively to form one-dimensional vector sources.
A proper selection of the codebook size is important. If it is selected too small,
too many errors will be introduced in the data transformation process because the
bin size would be too large. If it is selected too large, the states in the constructed
Markov Chain model will be huge. Through experiments, we categorize the data
under different mobility into 32 distinct values (the size of the codebook is 32) and
find this value provides a good trade-off.
The dynamic nature of MANETs makes it possible that some categorized routing
change values have a very small probability. For example, it is possible that a node
receives many RREPs and/or RERRs in some data collection period, which in turn,
trigger an abnormal but not malicious routing cache changes. The existence of these
kinds of data is undesirable in the construction of the Markov Chain model and should
be filtered out. We deal with this problem in the following way: if the probability
of one data item is less than a very small value, such as 0.01 (this value is observed
through simulation), we convert it into a “rare” symbol. In this way, the abnormal but
not malicious routing cache change values are “aggregated” into a common symbol.
The construction of the Markov Chain model takes a few hours for each mobility
level. Generally, the higher the mobility, the longer the training time, and the more
states we will obtain. When the mobility is low, we expect less changes of the routing
cache. In fact, when the pause time is very large (900S, for example), for a long time,
the routing table changes are 0. This also speeds up the construction of the detection
model.
When constructing the classifier using the Markov Chain model, we experimen-
tally set the size of the locality frame to 40. This corresponds to the data history in
the last 120S.
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3. Performance Metrics
We use three metrics to evaluate the performance of our local detection model. In
addition to the traditional accuracy (false positive ratio and detection ratio) measure-
ments, the Mean Time to the First Alarm (MTFA) and the communication overhead
are also considered.
• False positive ratio: As to local IDSs, it is reported for normal data not used
during offline training process and is computed from dividing the total number
of false alerts by the total number of transactions in the normal data.
Traditional wired IDSs are often built using the short sequence of system calls
of priviledged programs or constructed connection information. Therefore, they
can treat one program execution or one connection as a trace, decide whether
each trace is normal or abnormal, and compute the false positive ratio corre-
spondingly.
We are focusing on the network layer and there is no concept of connection
here. Therefore, we treat the subject (here is the routing table) activities over
the past locality frame as one trace.
In the process of scanning a test trace, when the alert signal of the past locality
frame is above the tuned alert threshold, we count it as one false alert. Making
a single decision as to whether a normal trace appears anomalous or not is not
sufficient, especially for long traces. We thus define false positive ratio as the
percentage of decisions in which normal data are flagged as anomalous.
That is, for a normal trace α, its length is denoted as |α|. The length of the
locality frame is denoted as L. Let alert(α) denote the number of alerts that
the local IDS generates over α. Then false positive ratio of α is defined as:
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alert(α)
|α| − L + 1 .
Let Tt denote the normal trace set. We compute the false positive ratio of each
trace α ∈ Tt, denoted as f1, f2, . . . , fn. n is the number of traces in Tt. Then
false positive ratio of Tt is defined as :
f1 + f2 + . . . + fn
n
.
As to the aggregation algorithm, it is defined as the percentage of decisions in
which normal alert aggregations are flagged as anomalous. Gateway nodes need
to execute the aggregation algorithm periodically. For a gateway node, at each
ti when it receives local alerts, it needs to make a decision (whether to generate
an alarm or not). When there are no attackers in the network, suppose one
gateway node makes n decisions, and generate m alarms, its false positive ratio
is defined as m
n
. The false positive ratio of the aggregation algorithm is the
average of the false positive ratio of all gateway nodes.
• Detection ratio: As to local IDSs, it is reported for traces of intrusive behavior
and is computed from dividing the total number of correct detections by the
total number of victims in the anomalous data. Any above alert-threshold signal
anywhere in the intrusive traces counts as a correct detection of the intrusion.
Let Ta denote the intrusive trace set. The number of traces in Ta is denoted as
|Ta|. For each trace α ∈ Ta, the local IDS needs to make a decision whether it
is normal or abnormal. Let alert(Ta) denote the number of alerts that the local
IDS generates over Ta. Detection Ratio is defined as:
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alert(Ta)
|Ta| .
As to the aggregation algorithm, it is reported for traces of intrusive behavior
and is computed from dividing the total number of gateway nodes raising correct
alarms by the total number of gateway nodes which should raise alarms in the
anomalous data.
When there are attackers in the network, if a gateway node receives local alerts
from some victim’s IDS, it should generate alarms. Suppose there are n gateway
nodes which receive local alerts from some victim’s IDS, and m of them generate
alarms, detection ratio is defined as m
n
.
• MTFA: This metric is defined over anomalous traces and measures how fast
the classifier detects the attack. It is desirable that the IDS detect the attack
as quickly as possible. Given an anomalous trace ξ, suppose the attack starts
location is La, our IDS generates its first alert after scanning the Ld-th symbol,
then the MTFA corresponding to ξ normalized by the length (denoted as L)
of the locality frame is given by MTFA(ξ) = (Ld−La)/L. We measure MTFA
over the anomalous trace set Ta as:
∑
ξ∈Ta MTFA(ξ)
|Ta| .
• Communication Overhead: The communication overhead is computed as
the number of transmission of local alerts in a given time period for one node.
It is mainly introduced by propagating the local alerts of intrazone nodes in
ZBIDS.
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For each mobility level, if the variance of one performance metric (Detection
ratio, MTFA, for example) is small, we only calculate its average result and do not
draw its confidence interval. If its variance (false positive ratio, for example) is large,
we randomly select 10 traces - that is, 10 runs of the simulation, and calculate the
average result as well as the 95% confidence interval. The confidence interval is
determined by the following formula:
P (X¯ − bs√
n− 1 < µ < X¯ +
bs√
n− 1) = 0.95
where X is the random variable, n is the number of running times, X¯ is the
expected value of X, s is the standard deviation of X, b is a number determined by
n and the probability distribution (we use t-distribution). Then the interval [X¯ −
bs√
n−1 , X¯ +
bs√
n−1 ] is 95% confidence interval.
For the detection ratio and false positive ratio, we also use different alarm thresh-
old, namely, 0.8*r, r, and 1.2*r, to watch the different performance values.
4. Parameter Tuning
We compute the conditional entropy of the normal data at different mobility levels
in order to decide the proper window size w that characterizes the Markov Chain
model. We change w from 3 to 12 in order to determine the desirable w for different
statistical measures. To compute H(X|Y ) (suppose Y is in the form (e1, e2, . . . , ew)
and X is in the form (e1, e2, . . . , ew, ew+1)) for training data at the same mobility level
and the given w, two scans of the training trace are required. The first scan records
the unique appearance of y and its probability distribution, while the second scan
computes the marginal probability distribution of x given y. In this way, we can get
the conditional probability P (y|x). Based on Definition 2 in Chapter III, we can then
compute the conditional entropy of training data. From the conditional entropy of
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Fig. 15. Conditional Entropy of Feature PCH and PCR.
different measures, we decide the value of w so that the conditional entropy does not
drop dramatically.
We use the determined w to construct the Markov Chain model. Two more
important parameters are the penalized value z when a transition is not found in the
Markov Chain model and the alarm threshold r. We experimentally determine them
in the way as we have stated in the previous chapter. We tune the parameters until
(Da(Ta)−Dt(Tt)) ≥ 1. Typical value of r is between 1 and 2.
B. Simulation Results of Local IDSs
1. Conditional Entropy
Fig. 15 illustrates the conditional entropy of feature PCH and PCR of training data
at different mobility levels when the sequence length varies from 3 to 11 with an
increase of 1. Each line here represents training data at the same mobility level.
We can see from the simulation results that audit data under different mobility has
different regularity. Audit data under high mobility is more irregular because of more
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unexpected changes, and this is the reason that will lead to high false positive ratios
in detection.
We can see that the conditional entropy drops as the window size increases. This
is because the larger the window size, the more information is included in the detection
model, thus the less uncertainty remained in the audit data. We can also observe that
the conditional entropy does not drop dramatically when the window size reaches 4
or 5. This motivates us that if we set the window size to 4 or 5, the predicted state
is highly deterministic if we consider the trade-off involved with much longer window
size values.
We also notice that when the window size is set to 4 or 5, with the decrease of
mobility (i.e., the increase of the pause time), the conditional entropy also decreases.
This implies that the data of lower mobility is more regular compared to data of higher
mobility. Actually, a closer look at the raw data shows that when mobility is very
low (the pause time is 900S, for example), the network topology is relatively stable.
Therefore many data items are 0, indicating no changes of the routing caches. This
is one of the main reasons why the performance of MANET IDSs of lower mobility
is better than that of higher mobility in terms of defined performance metrics.
Therefore, in the following, we set w to 4 and 5 respectively to build the Markov
Chain model and the classifier and watch their performance. Note that we have
performed the simulation when w is set to 6 and 7. The simulation results fit the
general trend and discussion described in the following.
a. Relative Entropy
In order to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the adopted features, we mea-
sure the REtest and REintrusion of PCH and PCR using two different mobility models,
the Random Waypoint model and the Random Drunken model. In the Random
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Drunken mobility model, each node moves independently with the same average
speed. Each node moves continuously within the region without pausing at any
location. It changes direction, randomly chosen, after every unit of distance.
Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 illustrate REtest and REintrusion of feature PCH and PCR
using the Random Waypoint model and the Random Drunken model respectively.
We set λ of Jelinek-Mercer smoothing method to be 0.9, which is a commonly used
constant.
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Fig. 16. Relative Entropy of Feature PCH and PCR Using the Random Waypoint
Model.
We can see from simulation results that REtest is smaller than REintrusion. This
suggests that PCH and PCR are suitable features and can be used to construct
anomaly detection models.
We can also see that audit data at different mobility has different REtest. Audit
data under high mobility is more irregular, therefore, when mobility is high, REtest
is larger and the difference between REtest and REintrusion is smaller. This explains
from one aspect why the performance of anomaly detection under high mobility is
worse.
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Fig. 17. Relative Entropy of Feature PCH and PCR Using the Random Drunken
Model.
2. False Positive Ratio
False positive ratio of local IDSs using different features (PCR and PCH) is illus-
trated in Fig. 18, Fig. 19, Fig. 20, and Fig. 21. As we can see, for each plot, the false
positive ratio increases with the decrease of the alarm threshold r. This is as what we
have expected. When the alarm threshold decreases, it is easier for the alarm signal
of the normal trace to exceed r, thus generating alarms.
We can also see that in each figure, the false positive ratio decreases with the
decrease of mobility, because as we have shown in the previous section, the trace of
lower mobility demonstrates higher regularity. When mobility is low, their normal
routing table changes are less dramatic and have less unexpected values. This makes
it easier and more accurate for the Markov Chain model to characterize its normal
behavior. Due to low mobility, the testing trace also has less unexpected changes.
This would contribute to the low false positive ratio.
Comparing Fig. 18 and Fig. 19, we can see the slight increase of the false positive
ratio shown in Fig. 19, which corresponds to window size 5. This could be explained
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Fig. 18. False Positive Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCH
When Window Size Is Set to 4.
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Fig. 19. False Positive Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCH
When Window Size Is Set to 5.
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Fig. 20. False Positive Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCR
When Window Size Is Set to 4.
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Fig. 21. False Positive Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCR
When Window Size Is Set to 5.
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as: with the increase of the window size, the Markov Chain model characterizes
the normal behavior of routing cache changes more accurately because more history
information is included. This will result in a larger probability to generate false
alerts because the small fluctuation of the normal behavior could lead to false alerts
generated by the classifier with larger window size. That is, the detector with larger
window size is more sensitive to unexpected abnormal changes. The same is true
when we compare Fig. 20 and Fig. 21.
Comparing Fig. 18 and Fig. 20, we can see that the classifier constructed using
the feature PCR results in a larger false positive ratio compared to the classifier
constructed using the feature PCH. This demonstrates that PCH is better than PCR
in terms of false positive ratios. Because each entry of the DSR routing cache contains
a full path to the destination, PCH considers not only the change of the number of
routes, but also the change of the length of each routing entry. Therefore, PCH
contains more information compared to PCR. This makes it more accurate to be
utilized to characterize the normal behavior of routing behavior. The same is true
when we compare Fig. 19 and Fig. 21.
3. MTFA
Simulation results of MTFA of local IDSs are depicted in Fig. 22, Fig. 23, Fig. 24
and Fig. 25.
As we can see, with the increase of the alarm threshold r, MTFA increases.
Because with a larger alarm threshold, the detector needs a longer malicious trace in
the current locality frame to make the alarm signal exceed the alarm threshold. This
will result in a larger MTFA. However, from simulation results, the trend of MTFA
is not very obvious with respect to the change of mobility.
Comparing Fig. 22 and Fig. 23, we can see the slight increase of MTFA shown
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Fig. 22. MTFA of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCH When Window
Size Is Set to 4.
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Fig. 23. MTFA of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCH When Window
Size Is Set to 5.
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Fig. 24. MTFA of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCR When Window
Size Is Set to 4.
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Fig. 25. MTFA of the Local IDS Constructed Based on Feature PCR When Window
Size Is Set to 5.
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in Fig. 23, which corresponds to window size 5. This could be explained as: When w
increases, the Markov Chain model could characterize the behavior more accurately.
A transition which is valid in the Markov Chain model with a small window size could
become invalid when w becomes larger. This could contribute to a larger r in the
context of our parameter tuning approach. Therefore it needs a longer history for the
alert signal to exceed r. The same is true if we compare Fig. 24 and Fig. 25.
Comparing Fig. 22 and Fig. 24, we can observe that MTFA of PCR shows a
larger value compared to that of PCH. Normal profile constructed using PCH makes
the distinction between the normal behavior and the abnormal behavior easier com-
pared to that constructed using PCR. The same is true if we compare Fig. 23 and
Fig. 25.
4. Detection Ratio
Simulation results of the detection ratio of local IDSs are illustrated in Fig. 26, Fig.
27, Fig. 28 and Fig. 29.
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Fig. 26. Detection Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on PCH When Window
Size Is Set to 4.
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Fig. 27. Detection Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on PCH When Window
Size Is Set to 5.
As we can see, in each figure, the detection ratio increases with the decrease of
the alarm threshold r. Because when the alarm threshold decreases, it is easier for the
alarm signal of the normal trace to exceed it, thus generating alarms. When mobility
is low, routing table changes are less dramatic and has less unexpected changes. Thus
it is easier for the classifier to identify the abnormal behavior.
We also observe that in each figure, the detection ratio increases with the decrease
of mobility. As we have shown in the previous section, the trace of lower mobility
demonstrates higher regularity. When the mobility is low, their routing table changes
are less dramatic and has less unexpected changes. Thus it is easier for the classifier
to identify the abnormal behavior.
When mobility is high, the detection ratio is relatively low. This is mainly
caused by “partial” victims. We use the data traces of all of the victims, including
the “partial” victims, as the data of intrusive behavior. Some “partial” victims only
receive a few falsified routing control packets during the whole intrusion session.
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Fig. 28. Detection Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on PCR When Window
Size Is Set to 4.
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Fig. 29. Detection Ratio of the Local IDS Constructed Based on PCR When Window
Size Is Set to 5.
94
It is thus very difficult for the detector to distinguish between normalcy caused by
temporary mobility-induced errors and anomaly caused by one or two falsified routing
control packets. The situation becomes worse when mobility is high because of the
quick link breakage. When mobility is low, however, the local IDSs can achieve very
good detection ratios.
Comparing Fig. 26 and Fig. 27, when w increases, the detection ratio corre-
sponding to the same mobility also increases slightly (except at low mobility level,
when the detection ratios are already very high). However, there exist some excep-
tion points. The slight increase of the detection ratio could be explained as: When
w increases, the Markov Chain model could characterize the normal behavior more
accurately and thus detect more subtle abnormal changes of the routing caches. This
could contribute to the increase of the detection ratio. In our detection model, we
notice that an abnormal transition that is not a valid transition in the Markov Chain
model with a small window size is not a valid transition in the Markov Chain model
with larger window size either. However, note that an abnormal transition that is
not a valid transition in the Markov Chain model with a larger w could be a valid
transition in the Markov Chain with a smaller w. The slight decrease of the detection
ratio could be explained as: When w increases, the alert signal could also increase.
This would make it more difficult to detect the attackers. Therefore, we observe a
trade-off here. The same is true if we compare Fig. 28 and Fig. 29.
Comparing Fig. 26 and Fig. 28, the classifier constructed using PCH results in
a larger detection ratio compared to the classifier using PCR. This demonstrates
that PCH is better than PCR in terms of detection ratios. The reason is similar to
when we come to the issue of false positive ratios. Normal profile constructed using
PCH contains more information of DSR routing caches, and is thus more accurate to
characterize routing activities. The same is true if we compare Fig. 27 and Fig. 29.
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5. Discussion
Simulation results of the local IDSs demonstrate that it is viable to construct a Markov
Chain model to characterize the normal behavior of routing cache changes and build
a classifier based on the data model. This classifier works well in environment with
low mobility.
The detection algorithm aggregates the mismatch counts in the recent locality
frame and thus is not sensitive to a single mismatch. This is important in MANET
environment because of the variations involved in MANET activities due to its dy-
namic nature. In this way, we could avoid high false positive ratios, especially in
environment with low mobility.
We could also see that the feature PCH is better than PCR. Simulation results
show that classifier constructed using PCH demonstrates better performance than
that constructed using PCR in terms of both false positive ratios and detection ratios.
This is because feature PCH considers not only the number of routing entries, but
also the content of each routing entry. Therefore it is easier and more accurate to
characterize the normal behavior of routing cache changes.
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) [82] curve plots pairs of false positive
ratio and detection ratio as points when various signal thresholds are used. We do
not plot the ROC curve of the local IDSs as most researchers have done ( [24], [25],
[23], [22], [?]) when describing the performance of wired IDSs, because we find the
performance of the local IDSs is sensitive to mobility. Actually, at the same mobility,
there is a gradual trade-off between false positive ratios and detection ratios: the false
positive ratios increase with the increase of detection ratios.
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C. Simulation Results of ZBIDS
We notice in the previous section that local IDSs constructed using feature PCH
demonstrates better performance results than those constructed using feature PCR.
Therefore, in this section, we use the classifier constructed using PCH as the local
IDS to evaluate the performance of ZBIDS. The window size of the local IDS is set
to 4.
1. False Positive Ratio
We can see that the performance of local IDSs at high mobility level is not desirable.
In particular, its false positive ratio is still high. For a realistic detection system, it is
important that the false alarm ratio remains low. Simulation results of ZBIDS in this
section illustrate that ZBIDS and the aggregation algorithm are effective in reducing
false positive ratios.
We compute the false positive ratio of the aggregation algorithm based on the
same test data used by the local Markov detection model for the purpose of compar-
ison. If in the last time period, the gateway node receives no local alerts, it will take
no action. The false positive ratio is then computed from dividing the total number
of false alarms by the total number of decisions made by the gateway node.
As shown in Fig. 30, the aggregation algorithm achieves much lower false positive
ratios compared to that of the local IDS. The local detection module could only use
the information of local communication activities to detect possible intrusions. Due
to mobility, it is very often that there could be unexpected changes of the routing
activities, which will lead to the generation of false alerts by local IDSs. The gateway
nodes, on the other hand, by aggregating the local alerts and routing control packets
in the zone, could know what is happening in a wider area of the network. By
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Fig. 30. False Positive Ratio of Local IDS and ZBIDS.
analyzing the probability of aggregated routing control packet source addresses, it
could effectively eliminate the sudden unexpected yet normal activities of MANETs.
In this way, many false alerts could be suppressed.
2. Detection Ratio
We compute the detection ratio of the aggregation algorithm based on the same
attack data used by the local detection model. We measure the detection ratio from
dividing the number of gateway nodes that actually generate alarms by the number
of gateway nodes that should generate alarms. The result is illustrated in Fig. 31.
As we can see, the aggregation algorithm achieves better detection ratios com-
pared to that of local IDSs. This is because the existence of “partial” victims is the
main reason leading to the degradation of the detection ratio of local IDS. However,
it is possible that in the same time period, the “partial victims” and some “full vic-
tims” of the same attacker coexist in the same zone, the information provided by the
“full victims” could make the gateway nodes detect the attackers. In this way, the
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Fig. 31. Detection Ratio of Local IDS and ZBIDS.
detection ratio is improved.
The arbitrary mobility could cause the routing control packets generated in an
unexpected way. The routing control packets generated by the attacker may dominate
in some time period. In the mean time, it is still possible that the routing control
packets caused by the attacker only have a lower portion, for example, other routing
control packets caused by the normal routing discovery procedure could cause a burst.
This could depress the generation of true alarms. We can see that this phenomenon
is more obvious with the increase of the mobility.
The existence of many attackers may lead to the decrease of the detection ratio
because this may lead to the decrease of the probability of the attacker source address.
This situation is worse when several attackers attack the same victims at the same
time. However, if the attackers do not collude, it is likely that different attackers have
different victims and their attack time does not overlap. In this case, our ZBIDS can
still achieve high detection ratio.
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3. Communication Overhead
The extra communication overhead introduced by ZBIDS is caused by propagating
the local alerts of intrazone nodes. We measure the communication overhead as the
number of transmission of local alerts in a given time period for one node. For a given
local alert, it will be transmitted once by all nodes in the same zone.
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Fig. 32. Communication Overhead of ZBIDS.
As shown in Fig. 32, we can see that, when there are attacks in the network,
the communication overhead is higher because of the increased number of generated
local alerts. We can also see that, when there are no attacks in the network, the
communication overhead decreases with the decrease of mobility. This is because
when the mobility is low, local IDSs demonstrate better performance in terms of false
positive ratios, thus reduces the number of alerts locally propagated in the zone.
Although extra communication overhead is unavoidable, Fig. 32 shows that the
overhead is trivial. In average, each node only needs to send about 2 to 3 alerts per
second when there are attacks in the network.
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4. Global View of Attacks
Due to the adoption of ZBIDS, the gateway nodes could provide a wider view of the
attack that is happening in the network. Expressed in our modified MANET class
hierarchy, an example of one possible aggregated alert is depicted in Fig. 33.
CorrelationAlert
name
Routing_Disruption_Attack
alertident
analyzerid        1
alertident
analyzerid        6
alertident
analyzerid        4
source
22
END
 
Fig. 33. An Example of One Aggregated Alert.
This example shows that the local IDSs attached to node 1, 4 and 6 generate
local alerts and these alerts are aggregated into an CorrelationAlert by the gateway
nodes. We can conclude from the CorrelationAlert that these nodes are the victims
of the routing disruption attack. Source indicates the identification of the attacker:
node 22. This makes it easier to track the offending mobile node.
5. Discussion
Simulation results of the aggregation algorithm demonstrate that ZBIDS could achieve
better performance compared to that of local IDSs. Specifically, it could reduce false
positive ratios at high mobility, which is desirable in practical environment. We can
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also conclude from the simulation that our aggregation algorithm can further improve
the detection ratio and provide a global view of the attacks.
D. Summary
Based on the simulation results, we can say that the normal routing behavior can be
established and used to construct the detectors.
First, the Markov Chain based local anomaly detection model works well in low
mobility environment. In fact, when the mobility is low, we observe less dynamic rout-
ing behavior in terms of the utilized features. This makes the simple Markov Chain
model accurate to characterize its behavior and demonstrate effective performance.
Second, we observe from our simulation that different classifiers should be con-
structed under different mobility level. This implies that training data of all mobility
levels should be collected in order to achieve desirable performance.
Third, using the aggregation algorithm under the zone based framework, we
could reduce the false positive ratio to an acceptable level, especially at high mobility
levels. Therefore, the Markov Chain based local anomaly detection model and the
aggregation algorithm under the zone based framework complement each other to
make a complete MANET IDS.
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CHAPTER V
TOWARDS ADAPTIVE INTRUSION DETECTION IN MOBILE AD HOC
NETWORKS
One of the main difficulties in building anomaly-based MANET IDSs is how to con-
sider mobility impacts when we design detection engines. This is especially important
because most dynamics in MANETs are caused by mobility. MANET IDSs without
properly considering mobility are prone to cause high false positive ratio, rendering
the IDSs useless. Most previous work on MANET IDSs adopts mobile speed or node
pause time to capture the influence of mobility on detection algorithms. We have
observed that mobile speed alone is not an accurate measurement. The extraction
of a common feature among different mobility models is necessary for tuning system
parameters in detection engines.
In this chapter, utilizing different mobility models, we first demonstrate that
moving speed, a common parameter in measuring the performance of MANETs, is
not desirable in measuring the performance of local MANET IDSs when we consider
different applications. We then propose an effective feature for IDSs, link change
rate, to dynamically reflect different mobility environment. Suitable normal profiles
and proper threshold can then be adaptively selected by each local IDSs through pe-
riodically measuring its local link change rate. Utilizing the Markov Chain anomaly
detection model as an exemplary MANET IDS described in Chapter III, we demon-
strate the effectiveness of our proposed adaptive mechanisms under different mobility
models.
The main contribution described in this chapter is to propose a unified mea-
surement to capture the impact of mobility on intrusion detection engines and an
effective adaptive mechanism to integrate the above measurement into local MANET
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IDSs for the purpose of abstracting normal/abnormal profiles. Most previous work
on building IDS for MANETs adopts mobile speed to evaluate the performance of
IDS and to tune parameters for feature selection. However, we observe that without
taking into account particular mobility models, mobile speed alone cannot tell IDS
how fast the link changes are and the parameters setting based on mobile speed will
not be accurate. At the end of this Chapter, detailed simulation study is provided.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section A, we study the be-
havior of the local IDS under different mobility models and demonstrate that mobile
speed, which is a commonly used metric for most existing IDSs, is not a good measure-
ment for deciding system parameters of IDSs. Based on this observation, we propose
an accurate and unified metric. Section B presents adaptive mechanisms which can
be integrated into MANET local IDS agent. Section C provides the simulation model
and the detailed simulation results.
A. IDS Behavior under Different Mobility Models
1. Different Mobility Models
Two mobility models, the Random Waypoint model and the Random Drunken model,
were simulated. In the Random Waypoint mobility model, each node randomly selects
a destination in the simulated area and a speed from a uniform distribution of specified
speeds. The node then travels to its selected destination at the selected speed. The
transit from one position to another position is called a movement epoch. On arriving
at the destination, it is stationary for a given pause time. After that, a new movement
epoch begins: the node resumes its movement to a newly selected destination with a
newly selected speed.
In the Random Drunken mobility model, each node moves independently with
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the same average speed. Each node moves continuously within the region without
pausing at any location. It changes direction, randomly chosen, after every unit of
distance.
2. Simulation Platform and Parameter Settings
We use a simulation model based on GloMoSim [5]. The simulations parameters are
the same as described in Table III. The same simulation platform is used through-
out the simulation process for the purpose of comparison. In the Random Waypoint
model, the pause time was set to 0 seconds. In each movement epoch, the speed
was uniformly chosen between the minimum speed and the maximum speed. The
{minimum speed, maximum speed} pair is set to different values in order to mea-
sure the impact of speed on IDS performance. In the Random Drunken model, the
movement granularity was set to 1 meter, that is, each node randomly re-selects a
direction every meter. The node’s speed is controlled by the mobility interval time,
which indicates how long it takes for a node to travel 1 meter. For example, a mobility
interval time of 0.1S is equivalent to 10m/s.
3. Performance Metrics
We use the following metrics throughout the simulation in order to investigate the
impact of different mobility models on the performance of local IDSs.
• False positive ratio: It is defined as the percentage of decisions in which
normal data are flagged as anomalous.
• Detection ratio: It is reported for traces of intrusive behavior and is computed
from dividing the total number of correct detections by the total number of
victims in the anomalous data.
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• MTFA: It is defined over anomalous traces and measures how fast the classifier
detects the attack. Given an anomalous trace ξ, if we suppose the attack start
location is La and our IDS generates its first alarm after scanning the Ld-th
symbol, then the MTFA corresponding to ξ normalized by the length (denoted
as L) of the locality frame is given by MTFA(ξ) = (Ld − La)/L.
They are the same as the performance metrics of local IDS described in chapter
IV.
4. Speed Is Not a Good Metric
In order to investigate the impact of different mobility models on the performance
of local MANET IDSs, we use the same parameters (the same number of discretized
output of VQ algorithm, “rare symbol” conversion threshold, window size, length
of short-term subject activity, penalized value, etc.) to tune alert threshold of IDSs
under different mobility models. Given a mobility model, the same amount of training
data, test data, and abnormal data at different mobility levels are collected using the
same procedure in order to build the classifier. A different set of data is collected to
evaluate the performance of the classifier. Detailed procedure is described in previous
chapters.
a. False Positive Ratio
When using moving speed as the parameter, false positive ratio of the Random Way-
point model and Random Drunken model is shown in Fig. 34. We use relatively
larger speed (small mobility interval time) in the Random Drunken model because
we observe that when speed is small in the Random Drunken model, the link changes
are very small and the routing tables are quite stable [83].
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Fig. 34. False Positive Ratio When Using Moving Speed as the Parameter.
In both Fig. 34, we can see that with the increase of speed, the false positive
ratio increases. This is more obvious for Random Waypoint model. With the increase
of moving speed, no matter what mobility models we use, the node routing tables
will have more changes. Therefore, the trace will demonstrate lower regularity, which
results in the higher false positive ratio.
We can see that although the moving speed of the Random Drunken model is
larger compared to that of the Random Waypoint model, its false positive ratio is
much smaller. This is because given the same moving speed, Random Drunken model
will not generate as many link breakages as Random Waypoint model does. However,
routing table changes are impacted directly by link changes, not node moving speed.
If a group of nodes move in the same direction, it is possible that although they move
at a very high speed, their routing tables experience small changes. This demonstrates
that speed is not a good metric in measuring false positive ratio when we consider
different mobility models. Setting IDS parameters based solely on moving speed is
likely to be incorrect.
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Fig. 35. Detection ratio When Using Moving Speed as a Parameter.
b. Detection Ratio
When using moving speed as the parameter, detection ratio of the Random Waypoint
model and Random Drunken model is shown in Fig. 35. From Fig. 35, we can see
that in both mobility models, detection ratio decreases with the increases of speed.
When mobility is low, routing table changes are less dramatic and has less unexpected
changes. Therefore, abnormal behavior tends to have a larger distance from normal
profiles, and it is easier for the classifier to identify the abnormal behavior. Also, the
phenomenon of “partial victims” is more obvious at high mobility, resulting in the
decrease of the detection ratio.
We observe that the overall detection ratio of the Random Drunken model is
higher than that of the Random Waypoint model, even if the nodes’ moving speed
is higher in the Random Drunken model. The reason is similar: network topology
is much more stable in the Random Drunken model than in the Random Waypoint
model at the same moving speed. This demonstrates that speed is not an accurate
metric in measuring detection ratio.
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c. MTFA
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
M
TF
A
Speed (m/s)
Random Waypoint
Random Drunken
Fig. 36. MTFA When Using Moving Speed as a Parameter.
The results of MTFA of the Random Waypoint model and the Random Drunken
model are shown in Fig. 36. For Random Waypoint model, its MTFA increases with
the increase of nodes’ moving speed. This is because larger moving speed could lead
to a larger alert threshold, therefore leading to larger MTFA. We can also see that
although the nodes’ moving speed is larger in Random Drunken model, its MTFA
is smaller than that of the Random Waypoint model. This again demonstrates that
speed is not a good metric in measuring the performance of IDS.
5. A Unified Metric
We have illustrated that node moving speed is not a good parameter in measuring
the performance of MANET IDSs. Our purpose is to find a unified metric which
is independent of mobility models and could be used to measure MANET IDS per-
formance. Because routing table changes are directly impacted by link changes, we
further measured the link change rate of different mobility models under the same
scenarios.
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We now define link change rate. Suppose for a given node, at time t1, its neighbor
set is N1; at time t2, its neighbor set is N2. Link change rate is defined as:
(|N2−N1|+ |N1−N2|)/|t2− t1|
|N2−N1|means the number of new neighbors during the time interval of (t2−t1),
and |N1−N2| means the number of neighbors that moved away during the interval
of (t2 − t1). They together represent the number of neighbor changes in (t2 − t1).
Link change rate can be locally collected by each node.
For a given mobility model and a given mobility level represented by {minimum
speed, maximum speed} pair, we compute the average node link change rate. Using the
computed link change rate, we combine the MANET IDS performance over different
mobility models. The result is illustrated in Fig. 37, Fig. 38, and Fig. 39.
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Fig. 37. False Positive Ratio When Using Link Change Rate as a Parameter.
As shown in Fig. 37, with the increase of link change rate, the false positive ratio
and MTFA increase, and the detection ratio decreases. Fig. 37 demonstrates that
if parameter settings of IDS are based on the link change rate, the performance of
IDS will be less independent of mobility model. Compared with nodes moving speed,
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Fig. 38. Detection Ratio When Using Link Change Rate as a Parameter.
link change rates can be used more accurately to measure routing table changes. A
larger link change rate implies a more dynamic environment, which makes it more
difficult to differentiate normal and abnormal behavior. From Fig. 38, we can see
that for the same link change rate, the differences of detection ratio among different
models do not have big gap. From Fig. 39, we can that the MTFA increases with
the increase of link change rate. All these suggest that the performance of IDS will
be less independent of mobility model.
B. Adaptive IDS
1. Adaptive Mechanism
The fact that link change rate can be used to reflect MANET dynamics independent
of mobility models motivates us to investigate adaptive mechanisms that utilize link
change rate as a security feature and integrate it into our IDS model. For an effective
anomaly-based intrusion detection system, an important requirement is that the con-
structed profiles should be adaptive. Adaptive profiles can account for normal network
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Fig. 39. MTFA When Using Link Change Rate as a Parameter.
changes to avoid raising false alarms. This is especially important in MANETs given
its dynamic environments, where different mobility levels will need different normal
profiles.
We introduce adaptive mechanisms into our systems by adjusting the transition
matrix characterized by Markov Chain and the detection threshold through learn-
ing its environments locally. Each node measures its link change rate periodically,
based on the measured link change rate in the recent history, each local IDS can
adjust the parameter settings of Markov Chain and the detection threshold. We have
demonstrated that different mobility scenarios will need different profiles and different
thresholds. Link change rate could provide a unified metric independent of different
mobility models and can be used to adjust the behavior of intrusion detection systems.
We take the following procedures to construct our adaptive MANET IDS, as
illustrated in Fig. 40.
• Offline training: Using different mobility models, we first collect the rout-
ing activities at different mobility levels. Following our existing offline training
approach to construct the Markov Chain based anomaly detection model, we
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Fig. 40. Adaptive Mechanism.
compute the detection threshold at different mobility levels. We further com-
pute the average link change rate at each mobility level.
• Online selection: The data collection module of each IDS agent periodically
collects its local link information and computes its link change rate over the
recent history, denoted as LCRrecent. Based on LCRrecent, the data preprocess
module discretizes the raw data and selects the corresponding codebook whose
link change rate has the smallest Euclidean distance to LCRrecent. LCRrecent
is also reported to detection engine, which can select the normal profile whose
link change rate has the smallest Euclidean distance to LCRrecent. This process
is summarized in Fig. 41.
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Procedure Select_Adaptively() 
Input: periodically calculated link change rate 
Output: normal profile adaptive to mobility 
Begin 
For each local IDS at time t 
Compute the link change rate over the recent history, 
denoted as LCRrecent; 
 
Compute the Euclidean distance between LCRrecent and 
each link change rate stored in normal profiles; 
 
Select the normal profile whose link change rate has the 
smallest Euclidean distance to LCRrecent; 
 
Use the adaptively selected Markov Chain to calculate the
alert signal of recent routing activities.  
 
Based on calculated alert signal and adaptively selected 
alert threshold, decide whether to generate alert or not. 
END For 
END 
Fig. 41. Pseudocode to Adaptively Select Normal Profiles.
2. Measurement of Link Change Rate
The effective implementation of our proposed adaptive IDS depends greatly on the
accurate measurement of link change rate. Link change information may be obtained
directly from some routing protocols, such as Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) routing, that use beacon messages to detect neighbors as well as link break-
age. In this case, our proposed IDS can re-use this information to save bandwidth.
In case there is no existing mechanism to provide link change information, we
utilize periodical beacon signal sent by each node to measure link changes. The
bandwidth cost of beacon messages is small. Nevertheless, introducing additional
bandwidth cost may not be desirable in building an effective IDS. Hence we need
to minimize this communication cost without degrading the measurement accuracy
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largely. The accuracy of the measurement relies on how fast each node sends out
beacon messages. The shorter the interval time of beacon messages, the more accurate
the measurement. But sending out beacon messages too often may consume too much
energy even if beacon messages are very short.
Although mobile speed is not an accurate metric for tuning IDS parameters
as stated before, mobile speed provides us with good heuristics on estimating link
change rate: high speed causes more link changes in general. Therefore, a fast node
should send out beacon messages more frequently than a slow node. By differentiating
beacon messages interval time based on nodes’ moving speed, communication cost can
be reduced.
Nevertheless, we should make the above measurement strategy independent of
mobility models. In order to achieve this goal, we propose a learning approach in
adopting beacon message interval time. Initially, a short beacon interval time is used
for each node in order to obtain accurate link change information. If a node observes
that there is no link change during several beacon interval times, it can increase the
beacon interval time to a larger value. When a node increases its moving speed or finds
too many link changes within one beacon interval time, it should decrease its interval
time. Since our IDS does not require link change information in a very small time
granularity (for example, providing link change rate every 50 ms is meaningless), the
above learning strategy can reduce communication cost effectively without degrading
the detection performance of our IDS.
Based on the above consideration, our local detection agent is energy efficient
because it requires very small communication cost. Although our IDS needs to calcu-
late feature values, the calculation is neither complex nor intensive. Also, compared
to communication, calculation usually consumes much less energy. For example, the
ratio of energy spent in sending one bit versus executing one instruction ranges from
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220 to 2290 in different architectures [84].
C. Simulation Study of Adaptive IDSs
We use the same simulation model, as described in Section 2, to perform simulation
study for the purpose of comparison. The result is illustrated in Fig. 42, Fig. 43,
and Fig. 44.
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Fig. 42. False Positive Ratio of Adaptive Local IDS.
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Fig. 43. Detection Ratio of Adaptive Local IDS.
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From Fig. 42, we can see that at the same link change rate, the false positive ratio
of adaptive IDS is comparable to that of IDS not using adaptive mechanism. Adaptive
mechanisms take into consideration mobility-caused dynamics and can change normal
profiles correspondingly. We can also see that detection ratio of adaptive mechanisms
and non-adaptive mechanisms does not show much difference, as illustrated in Fig.
43. When attacks happen in the network, abnormal routing table changes will not
expect to follow any normal profiles. That is, the introduce of the adaptive mechanism
will not enable the abnormal change caused by the attack to be found in any normal
profiles. This will lead to the increase of the same penalized value. Therefore, adaptive
mechanisms will not help in improving detection ratio. Because of the similar reason,
we also observe that MTFA of adaptive mechanisms and non-adaptive mechanisms
does not show much difference, as illustrated in Fig. 44. This illustrates that the main
benefit of the adaptive mechanism is to provide IDSs which are less dependent on
mobility models and keep roughly the same performance compared to non-adaptive
mechanisms in terms of false positive ratio, detection ratio and MTFA.
Because the Random Waypoint model tends to generate a link change rate which
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is larger than that of the Random Drunken model, we further generate test data with
relatively smaller link change rate of the Random Waypoint model and apply the
corresponding normal profile of the Random Drunken model to it. Simulation results
demonstrate similar performance in terms of the false positive ratio, detection ratio
and MTFA. This again shows that the adaptive mechanism provides IDSs which are
less dependent on mobility models.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we summarize the research, review the contributions, and discuss
important future work.
A. Conclusions
This research describes a nonoverlapping Zone-Based Intrusion Detection System
(ZBIDS) for mobile ad-hoc networks. It consists of the detailed description of the
local IDS agent and the nonoverlapping zone-based framework for the IDS agents
to collaborate. They complement each other to make a complete intrusion detection
system for MANETs. Because of the importance of routing protocols in MANETs, we
use the routing disruption attack as the threat model to illustrate the effectiveness of
ZBIDS. Simulation results illustrate that ZBIDS can achieve acceptable false positive
ratio and detection ratio.
The first question in intrusion detection research is what statistical features of
interest should be used to construct the model. In the history, short sequences of
system calls used by priviledged processes can be used to effectively distinguish normal
and intrusive behavior and utilized to construct host based IDSs. Tcpdump data could
be used to construct network based IDS. However, these features are not suitable to
be used to construct detection models to guard against MANET routing attacks.
Based on the experiment results, we utilize the percentage of the change in route
entries and the percentage of the change in number of hops as the features to capture
the representative behaviors of MANET network activities.
By collecting the statistical features of interest from the routing cache of mobile
nodes periodically and utilizing Vector Quantization algorithm (VQ) to convert them
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into discretized data, we utilize a Markov Chain model to capture their temporal
dependency and construct the normal profile. A classifier is then constructed based
on the probability transition matrix. Considering the dynamic activities of MANETs,
we use the average deviation over the past locality frame as the distance measure.
In the process of constructing the classifier, conditional entropy is used to determine
the proper window size, and other parameters are also properly tuned to consider the
performance trade-off.
We have conducted extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of ZBIDS.
Simulation results demonstrated that the proposed local Markov Chain based anomaly
detection algorithm could have relatively high false positive ratio when mobility is
high. Deploying local IDSs alone could also lead to alert flooding problem. Therefore,
we further propose the nonoverlapping zone-based framework and an aggregation al-
gorithm. By collecting the security related information expressed in the proposed
MANET IDMEF data model from a wider area, the gateway nodes could reduce the
false positive ratio and improve the detection ratio by utilizing the aggregation algo-
rithm. A global view of the attack happening in the network could also be provided,
which will better facilitate the diagnosis process.
MANET IDSs need to take into consideration mobility impacts in order to achieve
desirable performance. Utilizing our Markov Chain based local MANET IDS, we
first demonstrate that node moving speed, a commonly used parameter in measuring
MANET performance, is not desirable to benchmark the performance of MANET
IDSs when we consider different mobility models. We then propose the usage of a
new feature, the link change rate, to act as a unified metric in measuring MANET
IDS performance. We further demonstrate how to utilize link change rate to build
adaptive mechanisms into the detection model. Suitable normal profile and proper
detection threshold can be dynamically selected by each local IDSs through periodi-
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cally measuring its local link change rate. Simulation results show that our proposed
adaptive mechanisms are effective in lowering false positive ratio and independent of
mobility models.
B. Thesis Contributions
We recap the thesis contributions:
• We utilize the percentage of the change in route entries and the percentage
of the change in number of hops as the features to capture the representative
behaviors of the MANET network activities and construct a Markov Chain
based anomaly detection algorithm.
• We propose a nonoverlapping Zone Based Intrusion Detection System (ZBIDS)
that fits the unique requirement of MANETs. In this framework, each node is
attached an IDS agent that acts as a local detection module. ZBIDS creates alert
management points by introducing a two-tier logical hierarchy. This framework
could avoid heavy communication overhead and single point of failure. We
propose an aggregation algorithm which could further improve the detection
performance. All these local IDSs collectively form a complete MANET IDS to
protect the mobile ad hoc network.
• We propose to integrate adaptive mechanisms into local MANET IDSs. By
utilizing link change rate, a unified metric which could reflect the dynamics
of MANETs, the adaptive mechanism could dynamically select proper normal
profile and detection threshold.
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C. Future Work
Up to now, not many research efforts have been devoted to MANET IDSs. This thesis
provides our initial work in this respect. As a very new and promising research area,
there are several interesting and important future directions:
• We use DSR as the example routing protocol throughout this research to study
the performance of ZBIDS. One of the important future work is to study
MANET IDS performance under other popular routing protocols (both reactive
and proactive).
• Focusing on MANET routing protocols and using the routing disruption attack
as the threat model, we develop our ZBIDS to the full. However, because of the
difficulty to design a once-for-all security solution, we have thus far done very
little study on the protocol analysis at other MANET layers (Medium Access
Control layer, Application layer, etc.) and other attack models. We believe it is
necessary to carry out research in these aspects in order to guard against intru-
sions in a high-secure environment. For example, because of the richer semantic
information available in the application layer, a Denial-of-Service attack may
be detected earlier by the application-layer IDS. Therefore, intrusion detection
module needs to be placed at each layer of the node and coordinated to detect
the attack more accurately.
• In order to provide better detection performance, it is necessary to analyze and
categorize MANET attack models and system vulnerabilities. Existing research
work lacks the detailed analysis in this respect. However, sufficient research into
the attack scenarios is necessary in several respects.
First, this could help to identify more useful features that could be used to char-
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acterize the normal behavior of MANETs from various aspects. Defining good
features is one of the most important steps in building an effective detection
model. Possible other features may be constructed from traffic patterns and
topological changes. Their characteristics could be utilized to construct better
features.
Second, further defined features could also facilitate the construction of mis-
use based intrusion detection systems. Misuse based IDSs operate based on a
database of known attack signatures and system vulnerabilities. Their low false
positive ratios are very attractive in practice. However, misuse based IDSs are
impossible without the understanding of comprehensive attack scenarios. An
attack language needs to be defined to represent attack scenarios. Based on
these, suitable rule-based IDSs for MANETs could be constructed. It needs to
integrate with anomaly-based IDS to provide better performance.
Third, the cooperation of local IDS agents are required in MANET IDSs due
to their distributed nature. Aggregation and correlation of the security related
information are needed in order to improve the detection performance. How to
cooperate and how to design the aggregation and correlation algorithm also de-
pend on the extensive knowledge of attack scenarios. This is a really challenging
issue when the attack model becomes very complex.
• Appropriate intrusion response techniques are needed in order to protect the
network system. How to cooperate the intrusion detection and response modules
and how to respond to the identified attacks effectively deserve further research.
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APPENDIX A
SIMULATION PARAMETERS USED IN CHAPTER III
Table III. Simulation Parameters
Parameters Values
Channel capacity 2Mbps
Channel model Free space propagation
model with a threshold
cutoff
Transmission range 250m
MAC layer Distributed Coordination
Function of IEEE 802.11
Number of nodes 30
Moving region 1000m X 500m
Mobility model Random waypoint model
Minimum speed 3m/s
Maximum speed 5m/s
Traffic pairs 8 pairs with CBR traffic
Interval transmission time 0.25s
Data packet size 512bytes
Data collection interval time 3 seconds
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APPENDIX B
THE XML DTD DESCRIPTION OF THE ALERT CLASS HIERARCHY OF
ZBIDS
The occurrence indicators
? the content may appear either once or not al all
* the content may appear one or more times or not at all
+ the content must appear at least once, and may appear more than once
[none] the content must appear exactly once
(1)Alert
<!ELEMENT Alert (
DetectTime?, CreateTime, Analyzer, Source*, Target*, Assessment?, Analyz-
erTime?, Classification+, Assessment?
)>
<!ATTLIST Alert
ident CDATA ‘0’
>
(2)DetectTime
<!ELEMENT DetectTime (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST DetectTime
time CDATA #REQUIRED
>
(3)CreateTime
<!ELEMENT CreateTime (#PCDATA)
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>
<!ATTLIST CreatetTime
time CDATA #REQUIRED
>
(4)Analyzer
<!ELEMENT Analyzer (
Node?
)>
<!ATTLIST Analyzer
analyzerid CDATA ‘0’
>
(5)Source
<!ENTITY %attvals.yesno “
(unknown | yes | no )
”>
<!ELEMENT Source (
Node?
)>
<!ATTLIST Source
ident CDATA ‘0’
spoofed %attvals.yesno ‘unknown’
>
(6)Target
<!ENTITY %attvals.yesno “
(unknown | yes | no )
”>
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<!ELEMENT Target (
Node?
)>
<!ATTLIST Target
ident CDATA ‘0’
decoy %attvals.yesno ‘unknown’
>
(7)AnalyzerTime
<!ELEMENT AnalyzerTime (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST AnalyzerTime
time CDATA #REQUIRED
>
(8)Classification
<!ELEMENT Classification
(name) >
(9)Assessment
<!ENTITY %attvals.confidence “
(low | medium | high | numeric )
”>
<!ELEMENT Assessment (#PCDATA | EMPTY)*
>
<!ATTLIST Assessment
confidence %attvals.confidence ‘numeric’
>
(10)Node
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<!ENTITY %attvals.nodecategory “
(Intra-zone | Gateway)
”>
<!ELEMENT Node (
Location?, (Name | Address), Address*, Zone*
)>
<!ATTLIST Node
ident CDATA ‘0’
category % attvals.nodecategory ‘Intra-zone’
>
(11)Location
<!ELEMENT Location (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST Location
x CDATA #REQUIRED
y CDATA #REQUIRED
z CDATA #IMPLIED
>
(12)Address
<!ENTITY %attvals.addresscategory “
(unknown | ipv4-addr | ipv6-addr)
”>
<!ELEMENT Address (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST Address
ident CDATA ‘0’
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category %attvals.addresscategory ‘unknown’
address CDATA #REQUIRED
>
(13)Zone
<!ELEMENT Zone (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST Zone
zoneid CDATA #REQUIRED
>
(14)Name
<!ELEMENT Name (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST Name
name CDATA ‘0’
>
(15)Netmask
<!ELEMENT Netmask (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST Netmask
netmask CDATA ‘0’
>
(14)CorrelationAlert
<!ELEMENT CorrelationAlert (
name, Alertident+
)>
(16)Alertident
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<!ELEMENT Alertident (#PCDATA)
>
<!ATTLIST Alertident
analyzerid CDATA #IMPLIED
>
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